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iAbstract
In 2010 the Kingdom of Tonga experienced a democratic transition that saw the balance  
of power shift from a hereditary monarchy to the people. Elections were held that for 
the first time would result in a majority of Tonga’s Parliament comprising of democrati-
cally-elected politicians. Parliament was given the responsibility of nominating a Prime 
Minister from amongst its own ranks, who would in turn became responsible for nomi-
nating the Cabinet. These powers were formerly held by Tonga’s hereditary monarchy, 
whose role was reduced to one more akin to that performed by the modern monarchs of 
Europe. Since the 1960s, Tonga has received an increasing amount of overseas aid, espe-
cially from Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and, latterly, China. Historically, donors have 
not been overtly concerned with issues of democracy in developing countries, instead 
relying on the modernist notion that economic development would lead to democratic 
development. Since the 1980s, however, donors have become increasingly interested in 
the issue of democracy in developing countries, as a result of the good governance agenda 
and its successor paradigm, the aid effectiveness agenda. This thesis explores the impact 
of donors on Tonga’s 2010 democratic transition, concluding that the effect of donors 
manifested in a variety of direct and indirect ways. A retrospective analysis identifies 
aspects of Tonga’s 2010 democratic transition that could have been improved, and actions 
that donors should consider taking if faced with similar circumstances in the future. 
Finally, the thesis considers how donors can assist the consolidation of Tongan democracy, 
concluding that support should be targeted towards sustainable economic development, 
the rule of law, and the public service.  
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1I. Introduction 
In 2010 the people of the Kingdom of Tonga voted in elections that for the first time would 
result in the majority of its Parliament being made up of democratically elected represent-
atives. Parliamentarians were given the responsibility of nominating the Prime Minister 
from among their ranks, a position formerly filled at the sole discretion of Tonga’s hered-
itary monarch. The Prime Minister would then nominate his or her own Cabinet, to be 
made up largely of elected members, for the first time placing the responsibility of the 
executive in the hands of a majority-elected Parliament. Tonga’s 2010 democratic tran-
sition was the result of events beginning in the 1970s that challenged the monarch-led 
system of government established in the nineteenth century. 
Since the 1970s, Tonga has received a significant amount of overseas development assis-
tance from countries of the West, particularly Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, as well as 
from multilateral aid organisations, such as the United Nations Development Programme 
(Mountfort 2013). Historically, donors were not particularly concerned with democracy 
in developing countries, instead relying on the modernist understanding that economic 
development would lead to democratisation. That approach changed as the development 
paradigm moved in the late 1980s and 1990s towards good governance, in which democ-
racy promotion came to be seen by some actors and commentators as integral. Donors 
have tried various approaches in an attempt to foster democracy in developing countries, 
but elections have often been the focal point of support. 
The primary objective of this thesis is to explore the link between donors and Tonga’s 
democratic transition by considering the direct and indirect means by which donors have 
had an impact on democracy in Tonga. Three secondary objectives are designed to provide 
guidance to those considering democracy in the context of development.  Firstly, the thesis 
considers how the path of Tonga’s democratic transition could have varied to increase the 
odds of its success. Secondly, this thesis considers whether donors could and should have 
acted differently in relation to Tonga’s democratic transition. Finally, this thesis takes the 
opportunity to consider how donors to can assist democratic consolidation in Tonga, now 
and in the future. These secondary objectives are perhaps more relevant than a historical 
account of donors’ impact on Tonga’s democratic transition for actors in the ‘real world’, 
whose focus, appropriately, tends to be on the future. 
21. Research questions 
The primary objective and three secondary objectives are encapsulated into seven research 
questions that form the backbone of this thesis. The central question of this research, 
which aims to answer its primary objective, is: 
How did donors impact on Tonga’s 2010 democratic transition? 
In order to answer this central question, the thesis considers the following sub-questions: 
Who was/were the major actor/s involved in Tonga’s democratic transition? 
What was/were the major cause/s of Tonga’s democratic transition? 
What actions did donors take in relation to Tonga’s democratic transition? 
One research question is dedicated to each of the three secondary objectives, two of which 
inform a retrospective analysis of Tonga’s democratic transition and the response of 
donors to it. The retrospective analysis is guided by the following questions: 
What aspects of Tonga’s democratic transition could have been improved?  
Could and should donors have acted differently towards the issue of 
democracy in Tonga? 
The final research question considers the future for Tongan democracy, and the role 
donors could play in that future. It asks: 
What can donors do to help consolidate democracy in Tonga? 
2. Thesis structure 
This thesis comprises nine chapters, including this introductory one. Chapter two intro-
duces the research design of the thesis, and pays close attention to the use of interviews 
to generate its data. Chapters three and four provide the historical context of Tongan 
politics and its democratic reform in 2010. Chapter five considers the concept of democ-
racy, and offers a working definition of democracy based on an assessment of different 
approaches to democracy’s definition and measurement. The second half of chapter five 
uses that working definition to assess the nature of Tongan ‘democracy’. The first part of 
the sixth chapter offers a historical account of how democracy has been considered in the 
3development context. The latter half of the chapter describes some common approaches 
used by donors to attempt to promote democracy in developing countries. 
Chapter seven begins the analysis of the primary data generated specifically for this 
thesis. Its focus is the thesis’ primary objective: an assessment of the impact that donors 
had on Tonga’s 2010 democratic transition. Chapter eight is devoted to this thesis’ three 
secondary aims. It considers how aspects of Tonga’s democratic transition could have been 
improved, how donors could have acted differently in relation to democracy in Tonga, and 
what donors can do to assist the consolidation of democracy in Tonga. The ninth and final 
chapter concludes the thesis. 
4II. Research Design 
In their chapter, Designing Development Research, Murray and Overton (2003) divide 
development research design into three issues: philosophy, methodology, and logistics 
and practice. The structure of this chapter is based on the same division. The first section 
discusses the philosophical issues of epistemology and positionality. The second section 
introduces the methodology of the research, and pays close attention to the use of inter-
views to gather data. The third section analyses logistical issues associated with research 
of a political nature in the Kingdom of Tonga. The final section concludes. 
1. Philosophy
E p i s t E m o l o g y
This research sits within a realist framework, recognising that there is a reality independ-
ent of the researcher but that it is impossible to conclusively demonstrate the ‘true’ nature 
of any reality. Generally, it sits closer to positivism along the epistemological continuum 
identified by Sumner and Tribe (2008), which places  positivism and relativism at opposite 
ends of the continuum, separated by realism in between. In many respects it is akin to 
the post-positivism identified by the aforementioned authors, but in other respects it is 
not, and is informed by multiple ‘truths’. The schizophrenic nature of the epistemology 
underpinning the thesis is not unusual to development research, and it reflects the view 
of Bochner (2000), who argued that too strict an imposition of epistemological ‘criteria’ 
unnecessarily constricts social scientists’ research. As critical research, this research aims 
to “uncover non-explicit processes and relations … and communicate these to people so that 
they may act upon them in order to improve society” (Murray and Overton 2003, 21). 
p o s i t i o n a l i t y 
Valentine (2005, 113) states that it is important for researchers to “reflect on who [they] 
are and how [their] own identity will shape the interactions that [they] have with others”. 
Valentine states that this is a researcher recognising their positionality and being reflexive, 
and is an important part of the research design process. At first glance, a young, white male 
from provincial New Zealand with limited knowledge of Tongan affairs researching demo-
cratic reform in Tonga is a perfect example of an ‘outsider’ researcher. In many respects 
5the insider/outsider dichotomy was apparent during the research process, but it was not as 
significant as anticipated. Examples of Pacific and Tongan culture are now found through-
out New Zealand, and the two countries share many cultural similarities, reducing the 
issues associated with insider/outsider dichotomy. The ‘outsider’ nature of the researcher 
was in fact welcomed by several research participants, who valued the impartiality they 
expected it to bring to a subject that had been very divisive in Tongan society. 
2. Methodology 
Q u a l i tat i v E  R E s E a R c h 
While acknowledging that it is difficult to conduct wholly qualitative or quantitative 
research, this research relies more heavily on the former. It aims to adhere to the three 
commitments of qualitative research identified by Brockington and Sullivan (2003), paying 
particular attention to the first and third commitments: 
1. the world is understood by interacting with, and interpreting, the actions and 
perceptions of its actors;
2. research is generally collected in natural settings; and
3. research tends to create theory, rather than test it. 
Because the central question of this research is to assess how donors impacted on Tonga’s 
democratic transition, it quickly became apparent that the lived experiences of partic-
ipants, a central tenet of qualitative research, would have the most utility. The data 
gathered generated much theory, but this is not formally tested in a positivistic sense. 
i n t E Rv i E w s 
The data that underpins this research was nearly exclusively generated through interviews 
with people who were actors in, or close observers of, Tonga’s 2010 democratic transition, 
or events leading to the transition. Valentine (2005, 111) states that the advantage of inter-
viewing as a research technique is that it is “sensitive and people-orientated, allowing inter-
viewees to construct their own account of their experiences”. Interviews allow participants 
to describe events as they experienced them without the constraints of other forms of data 
collection, such as questionnaires. Valentine also notes that a key strength of interviews 
is that participants are able to flag issues that the researcher might not have anticipated. 
Such an incident happened during one the first interviews conducted during the research 
6phase of this thesis. A participant suggested that overseas aid had in fact hindered demo-
cratic reform in Tonga by providing the Tongan elite with a buffer with which to resist 
change. This notion had not been considered by the researcher before, and it was subse-
quently addressed in the remaining interviews. 
Participant recruitment was made through a combination of the researcher’s personal 
knowledge and contacts, snowballing, and good luck. In order to maximise the under-
standing of the research questions, participants with different professional, national and 
political backgrounds were sought. Potential participants in New Zealand that had been 
identified through the researcher’s personal knowledge and connections were contacted 
through email. One contact, who had assisted another researcher at the university in her 
Tongan studies proved particularly helpful, and offered a number of potential contacts in 
both New Zealand and Tonga. A number of other participants offered suggestions about 
other potential participants, allowing the list of interviewees to snowball, and crucially 
it avoided the pitfalls of relying exclusively on just one or two gatekeepers. Contact with 
Tongan participants proved difficult while still in New Zealand, with most emails left 
unanswered. Once in Tonga, however, phone calls proved a successful method of setting 
up interviews, and most participants were already aware of the research, indicating 
that they had read the previously sent email. Fortuitous meetings resulted in interviews 
with two politicians in New Zealand and a Tongan Government official. Interviews were 
conducted with politicians, government officials, and journalists from both countries, New 
Zealand academics, Tongan church leaders, and representatives of several Tongan special 
interest groups. 
While the method of recruitment provided a reasonably representative group of partici-
pants, it was confined solely to New Zealand and Tongan participants. It would have been 
preferable to speak to more representatives of the pro-democracy movement in Tonga, but 
a combination of factors made that impossible. As such, the research is open to criticism 
about its representative value, but the participants’ diverse range of professional back-
grounds negates this criticism to a certain degree. 
The interviews were conducted on a semi-structured basis, loosely following a schedule 
that is set out in the appendix to this thesis. The following advice of Overton and van 
Dierman (2003, 41) guided the creation of the interview schedule: 
“[I]t is important to balance the need to ask the same questions of each 
respondent (so that you have some standard frame for comparison and 
analysis) with the need to allow respondents to roam more freely with their 
answers (which can open up new possibilities for data but make analysis 
more difficult).” 
7The questions asked were sufficiently broad to give participants space to offer full answers, 
but remained within some parameters to enable sufficient analysis within the research’s 
timeframe. The structure of the interviews evolved during the interview process, with 
more emphasis given to certain themes depending on the individual participant’s 
background. 
Interviews were not conducted until six months into the research process, allowing for 
substantial acquisition of knowledge of Tonga’s democratic transition in the months prior. 
This allowed the interviews, all of which were conducted with professional people, to flow 
well, though the interviews undoubtedly improved the more that were conducted. As the 
interview process went on, it became increasingly important to make a conscious effort 
not to assume any knowledge, despite what had been discussed in previous interviews, in 
order not to steer participants away from their own lived experiences. 
Issues relating to power imbalances, particularly the relative strength of the interviewer 
in different cultural contexts that Valentine (2003) discusses, were not apparent. This is 
likely due to the fact most participants were elites, whether Tongan or New Zealand. One 
New Zealand participant did attempt to hijack the interview, though it quickly became 
apparent that the participant had little interest in discussing the research topic. Offensive 
views were occasionally presented by participants. Valentine (2003) notes the different 
approaches to addressing offensive remarks, with some scholars arguing that offensive 
comments should be challenged, while others prefer to maintain a rapport with the inter-
viewee. Both approaches were taken in interviews, though generally the rapport was given 
precedence. 
s E c o n d a R y  d ata 
The next two chapters, which provide the historical context of Tonga’s democratic tran-
sition, are largely based on secondary sources, in the form of academic journals and 
books, and other historical accounts. It relies significantly on the works of a small group 
of authors, in particular Ian C. Campbell, Sione Lātūkefu, and Kerry James. As such, it is 
open to criticism on the basis that it presents a narrow view of Tongan history, though the 
small number of people that have contributed to the historiography of Tonga makes this 
issue somewhat inevitable. The purpose of the two historical chapters is to provide a brief 
context for Tongan politics and its democratic transition, and as such it shies away from 
some more controversial events, such as the 2006 riots in Nuku’alofa. 
83. Logistics and Practice 
l o c at i o n 
Interviews took place in Wellington, New Zealand in August 2013 and Nuku’alofa, Tonga 
in September 2013. In total one month was spent in Tonga. The importance of travelling 
to Tonga to conduct research was demonstrated by the contrast between the problems 
faced trying to contact potential participants from outside the country and the relative 
ease of setting up interviews once in Tonga. In New Zealand, interviews were conducted in 
Wellington, where the New Zealand Government’s aid programme and the wider govern-
ment apparatus is located. One interview was conducted via Skype with a participant 
based in Auckland. Except for the aforementioned interview, all were conducted at partici-
pants’ offices, homes, or public spaces, such as cafés, and none took more than one hour to 
complete. Language never arose as an issue, as all the Tongan participants involved in the 
research spoke fluent English and agreed to conduct the interviews in English.  
E t h i c s 
Scheyvens et al. (2003) state that ethical research is about more than simply obtaining 
consent from a university’s ethics committee, and that it should go beyond the basic 
principle of aiming to do no harm. Ethical research should have the potential to do good 
and empower the underprivileged. While approved by the university’s Ethics Committee 
(evidence of which is attached at the end of the thesis), this research aims to explore the 
role of donors in Tonga’s democratic transition and offer suggestions to better target 
assistance in the future. Participants all provided their informed consent to partake in 
the research, which involved a clear explanation of the research followed by the signing 
of a consent form. All the interviews were recorded on a dictaphone with the permission 
of participants, and were summarised within 48 hours. Participants were provided with a 
copy of the interview summary, and were given one month1 to amend it. Most participants 
expressed satisfaction with the recorded summaries of their interviews, though some 
made changes. Participants who did not reply were considered to have assented to the 
summary. The most significant ethical dilemma facing the research was that of confidenti-
ality, which is addressed in the following section. 
1 In reality, this was a nominal deadline. If participants contacted the researcher later and wished to amend the 
record, it would have been done. Such a situation never arose. 
9Q u E s t i o n  o f  a n o n y m i t y 
Despite the overwhelming majority of sources, both in Tonga and New Zealand, expressing 
comfort with their identification, it was decided to keep all the sources confidential, except 
for a few rare, apolitical circumstances.2 Many participants remain involved in Tongan and 
New Zealand politics, be it as elected representatives or government officials. The focus of 
this thesis, a political reform process that was recently concluded and proved divisive in 
Tongan society, is controversial. Public identification of some participants’ views might 
negatively impact on their future career options. If participants strongly wish to have their 
views publicised there are other means available to them where they would have a more 
direct control over the process. 
While most participants expressed no concern with public identification, others chose to 
remain anonymous. In the case where the views of two or more sources was presented, but 
one wished to remain confidential, the need for consistency was pressing. It would appear 
easy to identify one source’s view and then conveniently offer a “confidential” view in 
rebuttal. The credibility of the thesis is enhanced by ensuring there is consistency in the 
identification (or lack thereof) of the participants. 
4. Conclusion 
Research design is a fluid process that ought to be underpinned by a reasonable under-
standing of the researcher’s own philosophical perspective. Interviews generated much 
of the data for this thesis, supported and contextualised by secondary data. As qualitative 
research formed the backbone of this thesis, it has resulted in much theory that relates to 
the unique circumstances of the Tongan democratic transition, aspects of which may be 
applicable to other democratic transitions in the world. Issues relating to ethics and the 
location of the research inevitably arose during and after the design phase of this research, 
but none proved to be insurmountable. The next two chapters consider the historical 
context of Tongan politics and its democratic transition. 
2 Where identification does not betray a participant’s political view. For example it is noted that the voter 
participation figure for the 2010 election was confirmed by the Electoral Commissioner, Pita Vuki. Without 
such confirmation the figure presented would be of little merit. 
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III. A Historical Context 
of Tongan Politics 
An archipelago made up of more than 170 islands, it is thought that Tonga was first settled 
approximately 3,000 years ago (Campbell 2001). Little is known of the first two millennia 
of Tongan politics, but a rich oral heritage since approximately 1200AD, followed from the 
eighteenth century by written accounts, provides a clearer picture of the past 800 years. 
The first section of this chapter introduces the ancient Tongan political dynasty, the Tu’i 
Tonga, which branched out into two other dynasties, initially the Tu’i Ha’atakalaua and 
then the Tu’i Kānokupolu. The second section discusses the initial contact with the West 
in early 1800s, which brought the notions of codified law and Christianity to Tonga. Both 
were shrewdly accepted by the first ruler of a united Tonga, King George Tupou, who 
oversaw the implementation of three codes of law in 1839, 1850 and 1862. The third section 
introduces the Constitution of 1875, which both solidified the hold of the monarch over 
Tongan affairs and established the foundations on which Tonga’s Government still stands 
today. The fourth section offers brief accounts of the reigns of Tupou II, Queen Salote 
Tupou III, and ends just as Tupou IV is beginning his reign in the late 1960s. The final 
section concludes. 
1. Pre-Contact Tongan Politics 
Like many Polynesian societies and cultures, Tongan politics prior to contact with people 
from the West was dominated by its chiefs. Tonga, however, is considered unique among 
the nations of Polynesia because of its indigenous monarchical system, headed by the Tu’i 
Tonga. The supreme power of the Tu’i Tonga over the islands of Tonga appears to have 
been accepted in some form since early in the last millennium. Tongan legend tells of 
‘Aho’eitu, the first Tu’i Tonga, whose father was the god of the sky, Tangaloa ‘Eitumatupua, 
and mother, ‘Ilaheva, a mortal woman. When ‘Aho’eitu reached manhood he travelled to 
the sky to meet his father but was attacked by his brothers, who were jealous of ‘Aho’eitu’s 
looks and strength. Learning of the attack, Tangaloa ‘Eitumatupua ordered the brothers to 
accompany ‘Aho’eitu back to earth to provide divine protection to ‘Aho’eitu as he ruled over 
Tonga as its first Tu’i Tonga. Succession to the position of Tu’i Tonga was through primo-
geniture. (Campbell 2001; Lātūkefu 1975; Ledyard 1999) 
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The Tu’i Tonga are understood to have ruled Tonga until near the middle of the last 
millennium, overseeing an expansion of centralised control of Tongan affairs, until civil 
unrest led to a reduction of the Tu’i Tonga’s power around 1400AD. Following the assas-
sinations of several of his predecessors, including his father, the role of the twenty-fourth 
Tu’i Tonga, Kau’ulufonuafekai, was reduced to that of a spiritual or sacred leader, known 
as ‘eiki toputapu. The responsibility of secular governance was placed in the hands of a 
hau (ruler), who was given the title Tu’i Ha’atakalaua. A second Tongan dynasty, the Tu’i 
Ha’atakalaua, was thus established, and quickly gained dominance over Tongan affairs. 
(Campbell 2001; Lātūkefu 1975) 
The pre-eminence of the Tu’i Ha’atakalaua did not last long. Ngata, the son of the sixth 
Tu’i Ha’atakalaua, Mo’unga-’o-Tonga, established a third dynasty, the Tu’i Kānokupolu, 
from his base in Hihifo in the west of Tongatapu, the largest island of Tonga. Strategic 
marriages, which had previously tied the power of the Tu’i Ha’atakalaua with the contin-
uing prestige of the Tu’i Tonga, strengthened the position of the Tu’i Kānokupolu. By 
the time of the fourth Tu’i Kānokupolu, Mataeleha’amea, the new dynasty had usurped 
the Tu’i Ha’atakalaua as the dominant political force in Tonga. The lineage of the Tu’i 
Ha’atakalaua was soon subsumed within the Tu’i Kānokupolu and the title became a relic 
of the past. Of the three ancient dynasties, only the Tu’i Kānokupolu continues today, 
bestowed upon the current monarch, King Tuku’aho Tupou VI, as it was his predecessors. 
(Campbell 2001; Lātūkefu 1975) 
2. Tupou I, Contact with the West, and the First Written 
Laws 
K i n g  g E o R g E  t u p o u 
The relative stability of Tongan politics and society in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seven-
teenth centuries allowed the country’s population to expand, which is understood to have 
contributed to the rise of local chiefs at the expense of the centralised Tu’i Tonga and 
Tu’i Kānokupolu dynasties (Lātūkefu 1974). The rise of ambitious chiefs with strong local 
support eventually led to a bloody civil war that raged from the late eighteenth century 
through to the first half of the nineteenth century.3 The civil war resulted in further 
realignment of Tongan politics. By the war’s end in 1852, King George Tupou claimed rule 
3 Sione Lātūkefu, in his 1974 book Church and State in Tonga, and Ian C. Campbell, in his 2001 book Island 
Kingdom, provide detailed accounts of the events of the Tongan Civil War between 1777 and 1852. 
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over all of Tonga and some early foundations had been laid for the democratic representa-
tion of its people.  
King George Tupou was born in 1797 and was named originally  Ngininginiofolanga, but 
was renamed Tāufa’āhau when, as a young boy, his recovery from illness was overseen by a 
priest, who was the guardian of the deity Tāufa’itahi at a place named Āhau. Tāufa’āhau’s 
father was Tupouto’a, who later became the Tu’i Kānokupolu, though his was not a rule 
that was recognised throughout Tonga, especially on Tongatapu. Tupouto’a did, however, 
rule over Ha’apai as the Tu’i Ha’apai from about 1808 to his death in 1820. When Tupouto’a 
died in 1820, Tāufa’āhau, aged just 23, inherited the rule of Ha’apai. Tāufa’āhau was soon 
subject to a challenge from Laufilitonga, the heir to the Tu’i Tonga. Despite early losses, 
Tāufa’āhau, using firearms supplied by Europeans who had begun trading with Tongans, 
defeated the challenge of Laufilitonga in 1826, consolidating his rule in Ha’apai. The defeat 
of Laufilitonga prevented the Tu’i Tonga from regaining political prominence. Tāufa’āhau 
elected to spare the life of Laufilitonga, who was pronounced Tu’i Tonga the following year, 
though he never again challenged the authority of Tāufa’āhau – despite encouragement 
from Catholic missionaries – and missionary accounts do not look fondly on him. He was 
described by one early missionary as offering “as much utility to [Tonga] as a large mole to 
a man’s face” (Lātūkefu 1974, 84). The title died with Laufilitonga in 1865, the 39th and final 
Tu’i Tonga. (Campbell 2001; Lātūkefu 1974) 
t h E  i n t R o d u c t i o n  o f  c h R i s t i a n i t y 
The first seedlings of Christianity had taken root in Tonga by the time that Tāufa’āhau 
defeated his enemies in Ha’apai. Missionaries from the London Missionary Society first 
came to Tonga in 1797 at the height of the Tongan civil war. Unsuccessful attempts at 
conversion continued until 1800, when the dejected missionaries departed for New South 
Wales. It was not until 1822 that missionaries returned, this time from Wesleyan Church. 
Initially, the Wesleyans’ efforts looked to be following the same path as its predecessor, but 
the persistence of the missionaries saw a growing number of conversions in the latter half 
of the 1820s. (Campbell 2001; Lātūkefu 1974) 
One of the first Tongan chiefs to accept Christianity, in 1831 Tāufa’āhau was baptised as 
King George. His reasons for accepting Christianity are open to conjecture. It has been 
suggested that, inter alia: Tāufa’āhau believed that conversion would secure British 
military support in his battles with other Tongan chiefs; he had lost faith with the Tongan 
gods after being wounded in battle; or he put the Tongan gods and the Christian god to 
a series of tests, from which the latter emerged victorious. In converting to Christianity, 
Tāufa’āhau demonstrated an impressive strength of character, as denouncing the Tongan 
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gods meant dismissing the justification for the social standing of chiefs, including himself, 
which derived from divine ancestry. (Campbell 2001; Lātūkefu 1974) 
t h E  1 8 3 9  c o d E  o f  l aw s 
In 1833, King George inherited the rule of Vava’u, a group of islands in the north of Tonga. 
With the help of missionaries he soon began to work on a set of written laws for the 
governance of his provinces. Tonga’s first code of laws was officially promulgated in 1839 
at Vava’u, though it is understood that the laws were established in Ha’apai a year earlier. 
Early nineteenth century Wesleyan Christian thinking dominates the 1839 code. Adultery 
and non-marital sexual relations were prohibited, the sanctity of marriage enforced, and 
work on the Sabbath discouraged. Many traditional Tongan customs and practices, consid-
ered heathen by the missionaries, were forbidden, likely resulting in the loss of substantial 
knowledge of Tongan history. Foreigners were explicitly subjected to the laws, though 
there were few settlers in Tonga at the time. (Campbell 2001; Lātūkefu 1974) 
The most noteworthy feature of the 1839 code was not its promulgation of nineteenth 
century Wesleyan Christian values, but its attempt to limit the power of the chiefs. The 
chiefs were no longer empowered to adjudicate criminal matters or decide on a guilty 
party’s punishment. The power of adjudication was instead placed in the hands of magis-
trates, appointed by the King. The hunuki custom, which entitled chiefs to claim anything 
owned or produced by commoners, was barred. The King was pronounced the sole source 
of law and authority. Limiting the chiefs’ powers can be partly attributed to the mission-
aries’ teachings about the equality of all before God. King George’s personal ambitions 
also undoubtedly influenced the decision to constrain the chiefs, many of whom likely 
harboured ambitions to usurp the monarch. (Campbell 2001; Lātūkefu 1974, 1975) 
u n i f i c at i o n 
In 1845 Aleamotu’a, the Tu’i Kānokupolu and King George’s uncle, passed away. With 
the missionaries’ support, King George inherited the Tu’i Kānokupolu title and as such 
he became the nominal ruler of all of Tonga. Along with the Tu’i Kānokupolu title, King 
George also took Aleamotu’a’s family name and became known as King George Tupou. 
The 1839 code of laws was introduced to Tongatapu in 1845, making all of Tonga subject to 
written laws for the first time. Acceptance of King George Tupou’s rule was not universal 
on Tongatapu and it was there that the final battles of the Tongan Civil War took place. The 
Ha’a Havea chiefs were particularly disdainful of King George Tupou’s rule. Their negative 
disposition towards the King was further fuelled by Catholic missionaries who viewed 
the King as a puppet of the Wesleyan missionaries and therefore the English. King George 
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Tupou’s response to the Ha’a Havea chiefs’ challenge was to appoint two of the leading 
antagonists, Ma’afu and Lavaka, as administrators of Tongatapu. The appointments 
were designed to either confirm the loyalty of the Ha’a Havea chiefs or draw them into 
open revolt, and resulted in the latter. The defeat of the Ha’a Havea chiefs in 1852 ended 
the active opposition to King George Tupou, consolidating his reign over all of Tonga. 
(Campbell 2001; Lātūkefu 1974) 
t h E  1 8 5 0  a n d  1 8 6 2  c o d E s  o f  l aw s 
The 1839 code raised the legal status of commoners relative to their chiefly leaders, and 
this was further enhanced by a new code in 1850. Though much of the new code repli-
cated the 1839 code it replaced, it did introduce some new measures to improve the legal 
standing of commoners. The code drew a distinction between chiefs with the authority 
to govern, and those that were chiefs only as a result of their parentage. The rights of the 
latter were explicitly reduced to equal those of commoners. The ‘eiki status of certain 
goods, such as turtles and certain species of fish, was partially abolished by the 1850 code. 
Previously, commoners were bound to provide all goods that had the ‘eiki status to their 
superiors, but the code reduced that obligation by half. Selling land to foreigners was 
prohibited by the 1850 code, a move that likely reduced the incidence of future foreign 
interference. (Campbell 2001; Lātūkefu 1974, 1975) 
In the years of peace following the defeat of the Ha’a Havea chiefs in 1852, King George 
Tupou and his advisers began work on a third code of laws, eventually promulgated in 
1862. While much of the code is based upon its 1850 predecessor, undoubtedly its pièce de 
résistance was clause XXXIV, otherwise known as the ‘emancipation edict’. It read:4 
All chiefs and people are to all intents and purposes set at liberty from 
serfdom, and all vassalage, from the institution of this law; and it shall not 
be lawful for any chief or person, to seize, or take by force, or beg authori-
tatively, in Tonga fashion, any thing from any one. 
Freeing the common people from vassalage and serfdom further undermined the author-
ity of the chiefs, while simultaneously reinforcing the power of the King (Niu 1988). There 
were a number of other significant changes from the 1850 code. The requirement that 
commoners provide tribute to the chiefs was abolished and replaced by a regime that 
required chiefs and commoners alike to pay taxes to the central government, further 
consolidating the King’s position. Chiefs were compelled to provide land to common-
ers, to be held under leasehold, the terms and rents of which were determined by the 
4 Quoted from Lātūkefu (1974)
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government. As long as rents and taxes were paid, people could not be dispossessed of 
their land. The King himself was for the first time made subject to the laws in the code. 
The final noteworthy amendment was the introduction of salaried judges, as the previous 
practice where judges profited from the punishments that they allocated caused much 
consternation in the missionary community. (Campbell 2001; Lātūkefu 1974, 1975) 
3. The Tongan Constitution of 1875 
More significant changes took place thirteen years later with the promulgation of the 
Tongan Constitution in 1875, which continues to form the basis of Tonga’s laws today. The 
Constitution is divided into three parts: a declaration of rights; form of government; and 
the lands. Its format and many of its concepts were drawn from the Hawaiian Constitution 
of 1852, which in turn drew on the United States Constitution. The oft-made claim that 
the Tongan Constitution established a Westminster system of government is incorrect, 
but the form of government it established is nearer to the British system than that of the 
United States. Like the Westminster system of Britain, Tongan Ministers sit in Parliament, 
distinct from the United States where the executive is constitutionally separated from 
Congress. This distinction allowed the Tongan monarch, who, like the President of United 
States, had5 the power to appoint Ministers6, to exert influence on both the executive and 
legislature. As Ministers were chosen by the monarch, their loyalties would lie not with 
Parliament, but with the King. (Campbell 2001; Hill 1991; Lātūkefu 1974, 1975) 
The Constitution established for the first time formal elections and representation of the 
people. The legislative assembly7 would be made up of twenty People’s Representatives 
elected by taxpaying citizens, twenty chiefs who had been granted the status of nobles, 
and four ministers of the Crown: a Premier; a Treasurer; a Minister of Police; and a Minister 
of Lands, collectively with the King, the Privy Council. The requirement that voters be 
taxpayers precluded women, as they were prohibited from paying taxes. Parliament had 
law-making powers, but royal assent was required for the enactment of any law. Likewise, 
the proclamations of the King required approval of Parliament before they had the full 
force of law. The King required the support of Parliament to declare wars, enter into foreign 
treaties, or pardon convicts. (Campbell 2001; Lātūkefu 1974, 1975) 
5 Until the 2010 reforms that are the subject of this thesis. 
6 Known in the United States as Secretaries, e.g. Secretary of State. 
7 From here on referred to as Parliament. 
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The twenty nobles8 were chosen from the chiefly class, not based on their rank, but rather 
on the number of supporters each could draw upon. This shrewd decision meant that King 
George Tupou faced less opposition to the Constitution than might have been expected. 
The remaining chiefs that were not granted noble status had no more rights than common-
ers. Each noble was granted an estate, from which they were obliged to provide land to 
commoners. Succession to their estates and noble titles would be through primogeniture. 
Succession to the Crown was also established by way of primogeniture. (Campbell 1992, 
2001; Lātūkefu 1974, 1975; Niu 1988) 
The Tongan Constitution could be construed as simply maintaining a system of a country 
ruled by chiefs for a central king, which had in many respects been established since the 
beginning of the Tu’i Tonga dynasty (Niu 1988). While that might be true, there is little 
doubt that the signing of Constitution is an important step in the history of Tonga that 
helped set the country on a unique course in the Pacific. It achieved international recog-
nition for Tonga, helping it avoid the fate of colonisation experienced by its Pacific neigh-
bours. Treaties recognising Tonga’s sovereignty were signed with Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States in 1877, 1881, and 1888, respectively (Lātūkefu 1975). 
Internal relations were markedly altered. In less than four decades the common people of 
Tonga had been granted equality before the law, freedom from oppression, and, for males, 
suffrage. The changes in the nineteenth century that were overseen by King George Tupou 
heralded a transformation from a traditional chieftainship to the beginnings of a modern 
Kingdom of Tonga. 
4. The Heirs of Tupou I 
K i n g  g E o R g E  t u p o u   i i 
King George Tupou died in 1893, and was succeeded by his great-grandson, who became 
King George Tupou II at the age of nineteen. His was a reign plagued by disunity and 
financial difficulties. Internal strife, as well as colonial rivalries, led to a severe curtail-
ing of Tonga’s sovereignty in 1900. The United Kingdom, fearing foreign influence in 
Tonga (other than its own), proposed a Treaty of Friendship and Protection. The Treaty 
established Tonga as a protectorate of the United Kingdom, who would take responsi-
bility for its defence but not meddle in its internal affairs. The negotiations floundered 
on the issue of foreign policy, which, much to the displeasure of the United Kingdom, 
8 Expanded to 30 in 1880, and to 32 in the reign of Tupou II.
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Tonga wished to maintain responsibility for. The final wording of the Treaty implied that 
Tonga did maintain the responsibility for its foreign policy, though in reality it could not 
pursue policies opposed by its protector, the United Kingdom. Amendments to the Treaty 
of Friendship and Protection in 1905 further eroded Tongan sovereignty. Under threat 
of annexation and in direct contravention to the original agreement that prevented the 
United Kingdom from interfering in internal affairs, the King was forced to agree to consult 
the British Consul in Tonga on all major government appointments and financial deci-
sions. (Campbell 2001; Lātūkefu 1975) 
King George Tupou II’s lasting impact on Tongan democracy is the Parliamentary reforms 
of 1914. By that year, Parliament had swollen to 70 members for a country whose popu-
lation was estimated to be 22,000. Tupou II oversaw amendments to the Constitution 
that meant that there would be only seven People’s Representatives and seven Nobles’ 
Representatives in Parliament, the latter being elected by the nobles themselves. The 
restriction of the number of Ministers, which had been four, was removed and each 
member of the Privy Council became a Member of Parliament, if they were not already. By 
removing the restriction on the number of Ministers and increasing the representation of 
the Privy Council in Parliament, Tupou II strengthened the hand of the monarch, largely 
to the cost of the people’s representatives. (Campbell 2001; Lātūkefu 1975) 
Q u E E n  s a l o t E  t u p o u   i i i 
King George Tupou II died young in 1918, aged 45. There being no male heirs, his eldest 
daughter, Queen Sālote Tupou III, succeeded to the throne. The long peaceful reign of 
Sālote, spanning 47 years, was marked by improved education, improved healthcare, and 
substantial public works campaigns. Her marriage to Tungī six months prior to her coro-
nation united the three ancient Tongan dynasties for the first time. Tungī, himself third 
in line to throne, was appointed Premier in 1923 and remained in the position until his 
death in 1941. The early period of Sālote’s reign was marked by internal dissension, which 
culminated in efforts by her opponents to impeach the Premier and his Ministers in 1940. 
The effort was unsuccessful, and Sālote was eventually able to overcome her adversaries by 
simply outliving many of them. (Campbell 2001; Lātūkefu 1975) 
Queen Sālote Tupou III showed little interest in Parliamentary reform in her early years 
as monarch. Her refusal to increase the number of noble titles infuriated those chiefs that 
had not been granted the title, the social class that dominated the ranks of the people’s 
representatives in Parliament. In 1944 it was decided to remove the Chief Justice from 
the Privy Council and thus Parliament, ensuring a greater separation between the exec-
utive and judicial branches of government. Sālote’s lasting legacy on Tongan democracy 
was her championing of female suffrage, which was achieved by a 1951 amendment to the 
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Constitution despite there being little apparent public demand for the change. Women 
first voted in 1960, nine years after the amendment, perhaps demonstrating a lukewarm 
response to the reform from the Tongan elite. (Campbell 2001; Lātūkefu 1975) 
K i n g  tā u f a’ā h a u  t u p o u   i v 
Queen Salote died in 1965 and was succeeded in 1967 by her son, King Tāufa’āhau 
Tupou IV. Tupou IV saw himself as a moderniser of Tonga, and focused on achieving 
economic development for the country. From 1965 onwards five-year development plans 
were released, much of which concentrated on improving the economic performance 
of Tonga. Tonga was granted full independence from Britain in 1970, three years after 
Tupou IV’s ascension to the throne. It was under the reign of Tupou IV that calls first for 
accountability and then political reform began to shape Tonga’s political narrative. Those 
calls are the subject of the following chapter. (Campbell 2001; Lātūkefu 1975) 
5. Conclusion 
The political system of Tonga underwent a significant period of rapid change in the nine-
teenth century. As the old regimes of the Tu’i Tonga and Tu’i Kānokupolu crumbled and 
the ensuing civil war subsided, one man stood tallest in Tongan politics. In less than 
four decades, King George Tupou oversaw the introduction of three sets of laws and the 
Tongan Constitution, in the process severely curtailing the power of the chiefs while 
simultaneously raising the status of the common people of Tonga and securing the inter-
national recognition needed to stave off colonial advances. The 1875 Constitution achieved 
the contrasting goals of establishing the foundations for democratic rule in Tonga and 
ensuring that King George Tupou and his heirs would maintain a strong grip on Tongan 
politics through the twentieth and into the twenty-first centuries. It was one of those 
foundations – the representation of the people – that would eventually cause the Tongan 
monarchy much trouble and contribute to reforms that severely curtailed the power of the 
monarchy. 
19
IV. Accountability, the 
Democracy Movement, 
and Political Reform 
By the time of the coronation of Tupou IV, Tongan politics had been operating under 
the Constitution of 1875 for nearly a century. The first section of this chapter considers 
early signs of discontent with Tonga’s governing arrangements, the first of which were 
about the land, as population growth squeezed land supply to breaking point in 1970s. 
After a brief lull, a series of events in the 1980s and early 1990s – the scandal surrounding 
Parliamentarians’ overtime payments in 1986, a parliamentary walkout by the people’s 
representatives in 1989, and the sale of Tongan passports to foreigners – led to widespread 
calls initially for more accountable government and then more representative government. 
It was during this period that ‘Akilisi Pohiva, a well-known proponent of political reform 
in Tonga, gained the public spotlight. The second section introduces the pro-democracy 
movement, later renamed the Human Rights and Democracy Movement of Tonga, which 
was established in 1992 and led the calls for political change throughout the 1990s and 
2000s. The third section outlines the events that led to a shift in favour towards political 
reform in 2005. The fourth section describes the moves of the Tongan Government and 
Tupou V towards political reform. It introduces the three committees that were estab-
lished during the second half of the 2000s to consider the issue of political reform in 
Tonga, the last of which, the Constitutional and Electoral Commission, provided a blue-
print for an alternative system of government that was largely introduced prior to elections 
in 2010. The final section concludes. 
1. Early Signs of Discontent 
t h E  1 9 7 0 s  a n d  E a R ly  1 9 8 0 s 
Public health initiatives that were established in Queen Salote’s reign resulted in a rapid 
expansion of the Tongan population, which, coupled with the size of Tonga, meant that 
access to land, as guaranteed to all Tongan males by the Hereditary Lands Act 1882, 
became a pressing concern. The Government’s apparent refusal to address the land issue 
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saw the churches of Tonga enter the public debate. The Tongan Council of Churches, 
viewing the issue as a social problem more than a political one, convened a seminar in 1975 
to consider the issue of landless Tongans. Tupou IV opened the seminar, but was disdain-
ful of the churches’ involvement in an issue that he considered outside their ambit, and 
defended the status quo. Parliament declined to send any representatives to the seminar. 
The seminar of 1975 was the first public display of the churches’ willingness to advocate 
for social reform, which they have continued to do since. Later in the early 1980s a Royal 
Commission was established to consider land tenure issues, but its findings were never 
publicly released. (Campbell 1992, 2001, 2011; Powles 1990) 
Also in 1975, the Atenisi Institute was founded by Futa Helu, a philosopher and scholar 
who believed in the Socratic method of learning that calls for all things to be questioned. 
Many future leaders of the reformist movement in Tonga studied at the Atenisi Institute 
and were heavily influenced by the inquisitive approach it advocated. Criticism of the 
Government, however, died down during the early 1980s, possibly due to emigration of 
many critics to New Zealand, Australia and the United States. The Parliament of 1981-1983, 
which is widely held to be of a particularly conservative ilk, passed legislation to increase 
the number of people’s and nobles’ representatives in Parliament from seven to nine. 
(Campbell 2011; Hau’ofa 1994; James 1994a) 
o v E Rt i m E  s c a n d a l 
A turning point in Tongan politics occurred in 1986. The Tongan Government, like many 
others during the 1980s, had decided upon a dramatic alteration of the tax regime that 
would ultimately result in those with less money paying more tax and the wealthier 
paying less. The tax changes themselves, though resulting in 30% inflation, were not the 
major issue. Instead it was the overtime salaries claimed by Parliamentarians for the time 
spent in their electorates explaining the changes that caused public outcry. Reports first 
published in the newly established newspaper, Kele’a, showed that some parliamentarians 
doubled their annual salary through overtime payments for only 12 days’ work explaining 
the changes. The circulation of the Kele’a increased fivefold and interest in the conduct of 
Parliament rose throughout the Kingdom. (Campbell 2001, 2011; Hills 1991) 
The 1987 election took place soon after the overtime payment revelations and was the 
first where political issues took precedence over kinship and local loyalties. The interest 
was unprecedented; 55 Tongans stood for the nine seats allocated for the people’s repre-
sentatives. Six of the nine elected people’s representatives entered Parliament for the 
first time. ‘Akilisi Pohiva was elected to Parliament for the first time as the third people’s 
representative of Tongatapu. Pohiva had already gained infamy hosting a radio show in the 
early 1980s that highlighted Government incompetence. He was also one of the founders 
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of Kele’a, a newspaper that continues to highlight perceived inadequacies of the Tongan 
Government today. Pohiva would become one of the leading protagonists in the struggle 
for more representative government in Tonga. (Campbell 2001, 2011) 
p a R l i a m E n ta R y  wa l K o u t 
In 1988 Pohiva presented a petition to the King, signed by more than 7,000 Tongans, 
demanding reforms to establish more accountable government. The King assured Pohiva 
that he would discuss the petition’s proposals with his Cabinet, though no changes were 
subsequently made. By 1989 the People’s Representatives had grown increasingly frus-
trated by their impotence in the government’s affairs. Following the defeat of yet another 
proposal the People’s Representatives staged an impromptu walkout. As if to press home 
the powerlessness of the People’s Representatives, the Nobles’ Representatives and 
Ministers preceded to pass legislation unopposed. When all the People’s Representatives 
returned to Parliament two weeks later – any longer and their seats would have been 
deemed vacated – two proposals were presented to increase the people’s representation 
in Parliament. Both were defeated by the combined votes of the nobles and Ministers. 
(Campbell 2001, 2011;  Hills 1991) 
The 1990 elections were held with the parliamentary walkout still fresh in voters’ minds. 
Pro-reformist candidates were elected to six of the nine available seats. All the People’s 
Representatives who boycotted Parliament for the full two weeks gained re-election. On 
Tongatapu and Ha’apai, reformist candidates campaigned for the first time in teams and 
were subsequently supported by the voters, with all five – three from Tongatapu and two 
from Ha’apai – winning election. The central issue at the 1990 elections, however, was 
not democracy but rather improving government accountability. The continued support 
for the reformists showed a growing political awareness in Tonga, though it was not clear 
at this point whether Tongans supported structural change or addressing the issues of 
accountability within existing structures. (Campbell 2001, 2011; Hills 1991) 
p a s s p o Rt  s a l E s 
Retrospective amendments to the Constitution in 1991 further fuelled the growing discon-
tent with the Government. The sale of Tongan passports to foreigners, a scheme designed 
to bring much needed foreign capital into Tonga, had been taking place since the early 
1980s. All up, 426 passports were sold. The constitutionality of the sales had been ques-
tioned, and the Supreme Court was reportedly set to judge the sales unconstitutional. 
Before the Court’s ruling was released, Parliament passed retrospective amendments to 
legislation and the Constitution legalising the sales, causing much indignation amongst 
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Tongans. An unprecedented 2,000 Tongans marched to the King’s palace to demand the 
repeal of the amendments and to clarify where the proceeds from the sales had gone. The 
King’s response was to blame a salesman in Hong Kong for the problems with the scheme 
and to announce that all proceeds had been accounted for. (Campbell 1992b, 2001, 2011; 
James 1994a) 
2. The Establishment of the Pro-Democracy Movement 
The collusion of nobles and Ministers to pass the 1991 amendments to the Constitution 
demonstrated that misgovernance could no longer be attributed solely to ministerial 
incompetence, but to structural weaknesses. Calls for a more representative government 
began to grow louder than the earlier calls for more accountability. In August of 1992 the 
Pro-Democracy Movement (PDM) was established to prepare a national convention to 
discuss democracy and constitutional reform. The convention was a great success, boosted 
by the publicity it received via the Government’s bumbling response to it. In short time, 
Government Ministers accepted then declined to take part in the convention, public 
servants were allowed then prohibited then allowed to attend if they took unpaid leave, 
and overseas participants were barred then permitted to attend, though some were still 
subject to harassment. Thousands of Tongans attended the convention where talks were 
not of revolution or overthrowing the monarchy, but of structural adjustments that could 
make the Tongan Government more representative or accountable. Leaders from both the 
Free Wesleyan Church and the Catholic Church took prominent roles at the convention, 
though the churches were not fully united behind its cause. The churches’ participation 
was driven by the perceived un-Christian nature of the actions of some members of the 
Government. Its support for the PDM likely encouraged more Tongans, many of whom 
are deeply religious, to take part. Foreign funding for the convention was sought, but not 
obtained. (Campbell 2001, 2011; James 1993; Lātūkefu 1993) 
t h E  g o v E R n m E n t  R E a c t s 
For the third election running, activities in the months prior to polling day boosted the 
profile of the reformist candidates. The 1993 election differed from the previous two 
by the direct involvement of the Government in the campaign opposing the reform-
ists. An Information Unit was established, headed by the Speaker of the House’s9 wife, 
‘Eseta Fusitu’a, which worked in concert with the Government’s chief spokesman in the 
9 A role that has traditionally been held by a noble. 
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campaign, Clive Edwards. The participation of Edwards, a lawyer previously based in 
Auckland, in the Government’s campaign was not without irony given official attitudes 
toward foreign-based Tongans in the lead up to the 1992 convention. The Government-
owned radio was partisan towards candidates that supported the status quo. Despite the 
involvement of the Government, the results of the 1993 elections were similar to 1990: six 
of the nine elected People’s Representatives were acknowledged reformists. The contin-
ued support of the reformists in the face of overt Government opposition demonstrated a 
rejection by many Tongans of customary politics. (Campbell 1994, 2001, 2011; James 1994; 
Lātūkefu 1993) 
Momentum for the PDM stalled during the following parliamentary term, though a victory 
was won early in 1994 when the People’s and the Nobles’ Representatives won the right 
to introduce legislation into Parliament. The reformist People’s Representatives began 
plans for a political party in 1994 to help facilitate a more united front inside and outside 
Parliament. The plans soon floundered, as differences between religious and secular inter-
ests proved to be insurmountable. Making matters worse, Pohiva, who had become to be 
seen as the chief protagonist in the democracy movement, was found guilty in a number 
of libel cases and ordered to pay fines and costs totalling T$94,000.10 Unity between the 
reformists was not restored in time for the 1996 elections, and unlike the three previous 
elections no defining event gave the reformists momentum in the months prior to polling 
day. The Government chose not to actively participate in the campaign, and in the end 
the results were similar to that 1993 elections. Of concern for pro-democracy supporters, 
surveys conducted in the wake of the 1996 elections found that issues other than political 
reform were more important to voters. (Campbell 1996, 2001, 2011; James 1995, 1996, 1997) 
i m p R i s o n m E n t  o f  p o h i va  a n d  o t h E R s 
The following parliamentary session swiftly became a testy affair. Pohiva and two others 
were sentenced by Parliament to thirty days imprisonment for contempt in 1997. The 
imprisonment received global attention and helped shift Tongan disputes into the inter-
national consciousness. It was later ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court and the 
three were released from jail five days before the end of their sentence. The Minister of 
Justice, Fusitu’a, was later found guilty of contempt of court for claiming that the Supreme 
Court was wrong to rule Pohiva’s imprisonment unconstitutional and for threatening the 
Chief Justice. Parliament had sentenced Pohiva for publishing details about an impend-
ing impeachment vote on Fusitu’a for allegedly attending the 1996 Olympic Games in the 
10 Donations from outside Tonga covered much of the fines and costs awarded against Pohiva, but the effort 
required to solicit those donations reduced Pohiva’s parliamentary impact (James 1995).
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United States without the permission of Parliament and in neglect of his duties. Fusitu’a 
was eventually impeached, but the motion was removed at the behest of the Prime 
Minister after Fusitu’a apologised to Parliament for his actions. It was the first successful 
impeachment of a Minister since the promulgation of the Constitution in 1875. 1997 also 
saw the first enactment of a bill presented by a People’s Representative, an uncontroversial 
amendment to the Land Act. (Campbell 2001, 2011; James 1998, 1999) 
t h E  t R a n s f o R m at i o n  o f  t h E  p d m 
The PDM underwent two changes in 1998. Firstly, it changed its name to the Tonga Human 
Rights and Democracy Movement, though wrangling over the use of ‘Tonga’ in the name 
resulted in its eventual registration as the Human Rights and Democracy Movement of 
Tonga five years later.11 Secondly, and more importantly, the HRDM employed a full-time 
director to manage its affairs, Lopeti Senituli, who until that point had been managing an 
NGO in Suva. The HRDM began to organise a second national convention on constitu-
tional and political reform in 1999. The convention’s organisers sought to include repre-
sentatives from the all sides of the debate, but the Government, wise to the lessons learnt 
from the 1992 convention, declined to attend and chose to ignore the convention entirely. 
The resulting lack of publicity meant that the convention was not as well attended as its 
predecessor. A draft constitution was released following the end of the convention, calling 
for 30 elected MPs and government ownership of all lands. (Campbell 1999, 2001,  2011; 
James 2000) 
The HRDM officially endorsed candidates in 1999 elections as reformers, though it 
did not encourage voting for any one particular candidate. Five of the nine People’s 
Representatives were endorsed by the HRDM, ostensibly a reduction in the number of 
reformist MPs. The total number of votes for reformist candidates, elected or not, also 
appears to have diminished. Whether or not there had been a drop in support for the 
reformist candidates is moot. In the past four elections it had been en vogue for candidates 
to describe themselves as reformist, or pro-democracy, but the candidates’ subsequent 
behaviour suggested their ideologies differed from those on which they had campaigned. 
Official endorsement from HRDM, alongside efforts to improve the accuracy of the elec-
toral roll, indicate that support for the reform movement might not have diminished, as 
many suggested at the time. (Campbell 1999, 2001, 2011; James 2000) 
11 The Human Rights and Democracy Movement, whether it was known with Tonga at the beginning or the end 
of the name, will for the remainder of the chapter be referred to by the acronym HRDM.  
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The HRDM kept a relatively low profile in the 1999-2002 parliamentary term. It secured 
funding from overseas donors12, which allowed it to employ more staff and expand its 
education campaign. In 2002 the HRDM made two proposals for constitutional reform. 
The first, released in April, was considered too timid by pro-democracy leaders, and was 
replaced in September by a second proposal. The second proposal called for a fully elected 
Parliament, and guaranteed representation for nobles, women and overseas Tongans. 
Parliament would elect the Prime Minister, who would choose his or her Cabinet from 
parliamentarians. There was no official response to either of the two proposals. (Campbell 
2005, 2011; James 2001, 2002) 
3. The Tide Begins Shifting Towards Reform 
n E w  Z E a l a n d  i n t E Rv E n E s 
The campaign for the 2002 elections was marred by international intervention. New 
Zealand’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Phil Goff, and his associate, Matt Robson, were 
critical of the Tongan Government, accusing it of corruption, failing to uphold consti-
tutional rights, and stalling the political reform process. Goff suggested that failure to 
address these concerns could result in a reassessment of New Zealand’s aid allocation to 
Tonga. Unsurprisingly, the Tongan Government was indignant towards the foreign inter-
vention in its sovereign affairs. The results of the election were an improvement for the 
pro-democracy movement, with seven of the nine elected People’s Representatives under-
stood to favour reform. In the wake of the election, Pohiva called for a national referendum 
on political reform, but the idea failed to gain traction. (Campbell 2011; James 2002a, 2003) 
t h E  m E d i a  b a n 
In 2003 the Government went on the attack against two of its main opponents, Pohiva and 
the newspaper Taimi ‘o Tonga. Pohiva, along with his son, now the editor of Kele’a, and 
daughter were charged with sedition and treason following the publication of claims that 
12 The overseas funding of the HRDM is subject to further analysis later in this thesis. Efforts to discover exactly 
where this funding came from proved unfruitful. Alongside the reference in Campbell (2011), five separate 
Tongan sources, including one former member of the HRDM, confirmed the funding from overseas donors, 
though none were able to state precisely what bodies provided the funding. One source made a reference 
to “an overseas Christian organisation”. Several representatives from the New Zealand Aid Programme 
denied providing funds to the HRDM on the basis that it was considered a political party, though this was 
contradicted by one Tongan source that has closely observed the HRDM since its establishment. 
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the King had amassed a T$350 million fortune. The charges were not upheld by the courts. 
Early in 2003, the Government attempted to ban the import of Taimi ‘o Tonga, which was 
published in New Zealand, on a number of grounds that ultimately amounted to an allega-
tion that the newspaper had campaigned to overthrow the Government. The intervention 
was heavy-handed and affected several media organisations, including Matangi Tonga, 
which was forced to become an online publication. The Government’s early attempts to 
have the Taimi banned were ruled illegal by the Supreme Court, which resulted in legisla-
tion outlawing publications that were more than 20% foreign-owned and an amendment 
to the Freedom of Expression clause of the Constitution. Four nobles, including the King’s 
nephew, ‘Uluvalu, who had inherited the title Prince Tu’ipelehake, and the Speaker, joined 
the People’s Representatives in voting against the amendment to the Constitution, which 
was ruled invalid by the Supreme Court the following year. (Campbell 2011) 
m i n i s t E R i a l  a p p o i n t m E n t s  o f  p E o p l E ’s  R E p R E s E n tat i v E s 
Events began to turn in favour of the reformists in 2004. Prince Tu’ipelehake presented 
a motion to Parliament to establish a committee to ascertain the Tongan people’s views 
about political reform. After initial reluctance the motion was passed after it became clear 
that it had the support of the Crown Prince, Tupouto’a, who was increasingly acting as 
the Regent while his elderly father, Tupou IV, received medical treatment. The support of 
the Crown Prince was integral to the Government’s announcement in November that two 
People’s Representatives and two Nobles’ Representatives would be elevated to Cabinet 
following the 2005 elections. The news was met with a mixed reaction. The Government’s 
stipulation that the appointed Ministers would only serve for the parliamentary term, and 
would have to resign their seats, forcing by-elections, meant that it would be difficult for 
a Minister to gain re-election. The requirement that the appointed Ministers be re-elected 
was necessary according to the Government, as it envisaged that the entire Cabinet would 
eventually be appointed in that manner. The appointments were made following the 
elections in early 2005. Dr Feleti Sevele, whose friendship with the Crown Prince spanned 
several decades, and Sione Peauafi Haukinima became Ministers, forcing by-elections in 
Tongatapu and the Niuas. (Campbell 2006, 2008, 2011; Powles 2007) 
p u b l i c  s E c t o R  s t R i K E s 
Partway through 2005 Parliament voted to raise the salaries of the upper management 
level of the public service. To the Government’s surprise, the pay increases were rejected 
by the public servants on the basis that they were inequitable. When a counter-proposal 
for more equitable pay increases was rejected by the Government, the public servants 
elected to go on strike. The public servants’ resolve showed no sign of breaking, and by the 
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third week of the strike its demands swelled to include political reform. The strike lasted 
six weeks, and ended when the Government agreed to the public servants’ pay demands 
and to consider establishing a Royal Commission to consider political reform. The 
Government’s eventual acceptance to all of the strikers’ demands weakened its standing 
in the eyes of many Tongans and served as the catalyst for the unification of many dispa-
rate groups behind the cause of political reform. (Campbell 2006, 2008, 2011; Powles 2007; 
Young Leslie 2007) 
4. The Government Moves Towards Reform 
n at i o n a l  c o m m i t t E E  o n  p o l i t i c a l  R E f o R m 
Soon after the strike ended, Parliament began work on the terms of reference for the 
committee established by Prince Tu’ipelehake’s motion in 2004. The National Committee 
on Political Reform (NCPR) was the first of three high-level committees to consider polit-
ical reform. Its wide-ranging brief was to conduct public meetings throughout Tonga 
and overseas to ascertain the Tongan public’s views about political reform and the polit-
ical system generally. The NCPR was chaired by Prince Tu’ipelehake, who was joined 
by six MPs and four Tongan professionals. The NCPR was to report its findings to the 
Government by 31 August 2006. Sadly, Prince Tu’ipelehake, along with his wife, died in 
a car crash driving to what would have been the final public meeting of the NCPR in the 
United States. The work of the NCPR was partly funded through the New Zealand Aid 
Programme.13 (Campbell 2011; Powles 2007, 2012; Young Leslie 2007) 
The NCPR reported back to the Government on schedule. Its report is a long and verbose 
document that required two weeks to be fully presented to the Tongan Parliament. The 
report called for the number of People’s Representatives to increase to seventeen, while the 
number of seats allocated to nobles would remain nine. The NCPR suggested that the King 
retain the power to appoint the Prime Minister, who would then chose his own Cabinet 
from the elected MPs. The NCPR set out a road map for political reform, which would 
culminate in elections under new rules in 2009. Cabinet considered the NCPR report and 
offered its own suggestion that would reduce the number of People’s Representatives to 
fourteen and retain the right for the King to appoint two the Ministers to Cabinet from 
outside Parliament. (Campbell 2011; Powles 2007) 
13 This was confirmed by several diplomats from New Zealand, and one participant of the NCPR. 
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t h E  c o R o n at i o n  o f  t u p o u  V a n d  t h E  R i s E  f E l E t i  s E v E l E 
Shortly after the NCPR report was presented to the Government, but before Cabinet made 
its own proposals and debate on the matter took place in Parliament, King Tupou IV 
died. Tupoutu’a ascended to the throne almost immediately and left little doubt as to his 
position on the reforms. Tupou V pronounced that he would act only on the advice of the 
Prime Minister, by this stage his friend Feleti Sevele, the first Tongan not of royal or noble 
heritage to hold the position (Campbell 2011). Sevele had been a People’s Representative 
since 1999 and a member of the PDM until an acrimonious split with Pohiva following his 
ascension to Cabinet. He was appointed under the reign of the ailing Tupou IV, and agreed 
to the appointment with the then Crown Prince on the basis that the two men would work 
together on a five-year plan to reform Tongan politics and bring greater democracy to the 
country.14 
a s s E m b ly  t R i p a Rt i t E  c o m m i t t E E 
Riots in November 2006 caused the cessation of Parliamentary debates on the NCPR 
report and Cabinet’s proposal. The motives for the riots were and remain unclear. Property 
and businesses associated with the royal family, Ministers, and immigrants were targeted 
by the rioters.15 The riots did not affect the Government’s resolve to enact political reforms. 
In January 2007 the Prime Minister announced that the proposal to form a Parliamentary 
Committee to consider the NCPR report and Cabinet’s subsequent proposal remained 
live. The Assembly Tripartite Committee (ATC) was commissioned in July and consisted 
of representatives from each of the three parliamentary blocs: People’s Representatives, 
Nobles’ Representatives, and Ministers. Given little time to consider the two proposals for 
reform, the ATC reported back to Parliament with a model that was similar to Cabinet’s 
proposal but with three extra seats for the People’s Representatives. When it became clear 
that the recommendations of the ATC would not be accepted as the final recommenda-
tions for political reform, the three People’s Representatives withdrew their support and 
called for the introduction of the model espoused by the NCPR. (Campbell 2011; Powles 
2007) 
t h E  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a n d  E l E c t o R a l  c o m m i s s i o n 
The 2008 elections were held in front of markedly different backdrop than previous 
elections. The Government announced that the elections would be the last held under 
14 This was confirmed by several research participants. 
15 Pohiva and four other people’s representatives were charged with sedition in relation to the riots, but the 
charges were dismissed against four the people’s representatives in 2007. 
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the existing laws. The issue was no longer about the need for political reform, but what 
reform should look like and when it should be implemented. The election resulted in a 
Parliament that was similar to its predecessor. Soon after Parliament resumed sitting in 
July the Constitutional and Electoral Commission Act was passed. The Act established 
the Constitutional and Electoral Commission (CEC), which was charged with considering 
options for political reform and drafting the necessary legislation. Its work was to be more 
technical in nature than that of the two previous committees, and would include thorough 
analyses of the future roles of the Monarch and the Ministers. The CEC comprised 
one nominee from each of the Cabinet, the Nobles’ Representatives and the People’s 
Representatives, plus two others chosen by the Judicial Services Commission and was 
chaired by former Chief Justice of Tonga, Gordon Ward. The CEC was tasked with complet-
ing its deliberations and submitting a report and accompanying legislation by November 
2009. (Campbell 2011; Powles 2009, 2012) 
The CEC report made similar recommendations to those of its predecessors. It called 
for a Parliament made up of seventeen People’s Representatives and nine Nobles’ 
Representatives. Parliament would elect the Prime Minister, who would then appoint a 
Cabinet from the elected MPs. Cabinet would be restricted in size to eleven, thus prevent-
ing it from obtaining a majority in Parliament. The Monarch would lose his or her execu-
tive powers, but would retain the right to veto legislation or dissolve Parliament, consid-
ered a necessary check on democratic excess. Constitutional amendments would require 
two-thirds support of the Parliament for each of the three readings of the amendment bill. 
(Campbell 2011; Powles 2012) 
p a R l i a m E n t  R E a c h E s  a g R E E m E n t 
Parliament finished its deliberations on the CEC Report the following April. It accepted 
many of the eighty-two recommendations in the CEC report, including increasing the 
people’s representation to seventeen seats and leaving the nobles’ representation at nine 
seats. The Monarch would appoint the Prime Minister following the will of Parliament, 
and would appoint Ministers on advice of the Prime Minister. Contrary to the recommen-
dation of the CEC, provision to appoint up to four Ministers from outside Parliament was 
created, leading to a possible expansion of Parliament to thirty. Cabinet, however, could 
not reach a size to give it a majority in Parliament. In an effort to protect Parliament from 
nefarious delay, votes of no confidence were prohibited in the first eighteen months of a 
Government, and for twelve months following an unsuccessful motion. Constitutional 
amendments would only require a simple majority in Parliament, setting up the possibility 
of the People’s Representatives combining to remove the constitutional privileges afforded 
to nobles and their heirs. Parliament declined to accept the recommendations of the CEC 
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and introduce a transferable voting system for block electorates, but instead introduced 
seventeen single-member constituencies whose members would be elected by a first-past-
the-post method. The parliamentary term, which had been three years since early in the 
twentieth century, was extended to four years. (Campbell 2011; Powles 2012) 
The first elections under these new conditions were held five months later in November 
2010. Despite the superior number of People’s Representatives, the elections resulted in 
the appointment of a noble, Lord Tu’ivakano, as the first parliamentarily elected Prime 
Minister of Tonga. Pohiva, who many had predicted would become the Prime Minister, 
was appointed Minister of Health, but resigned from Cabinet in less than a week. He has 
remained outside of Cabinet since. (Campbell 2011) 
5. Conclusion 
The Tongan experience of politics and democracy is not only unique among its Pacific 
neighbours, but throughout the world. Political reform was slow to arrive largely due to 
the cautious nature and reverence for the Monarchy that many Tongans share, but it is 
those qualities that likely prevented Tonga from descending into the internal strife that 
marred the histories of many Pacific countries in the twentieth century. The electoral 
changes of 2010 were a victory for democracy advocates, gained through the mechanisms 
of change that should be closely associated with democratic states throughout the world: 
peaceful protest; a free media; a strong and independent judiciary; and the leadership and 
persistence of politicians elected to represent the views of the people. The people of Tonga 
whispered, the people of Tonga spoke, and finally the people of Tonga shouted for political 
reform. In 2010 those calls were ultimately heeded. 
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V. What is ‘Democracy’ 
and is Tonga ‘Democratic’? 
Having introduced the Tongan democratic movement and the democratic reforms of 2010 
in the previous chapter, this thesis now turns to consider the nature of Tongan democracy. 
The first section of this chapter considers what exactly is meant by ‘democracy’. Minimal 
and maximal definitions offer different approaches to defining democracy. The latter is 
perhaps too high a threshold for countries inexperienced with democracy, the former 
perhaps too easily met by countries merely masquerading as democracies. Democracy is a 
staged process, moving through transition to consolidation, along a continuum that moves 
from authoritarianism to democracy. Its measure has been considered by a number of 
scholars and non-governmental organisations, three of which are considered in detail. 
Informed by the theories set out in the first section, the second section provides a working 
definition of democracy and its measure. This thesis contends that voter participation, 
executive recruitment, and constraints on the executive are the three most important 
measures of democracy, with the underlying caveat that democracy is a set of values, not 
rules. The third section assesses Tonga against the three measures, and concludes that it is 
situated further along the continuum to democracy (and away from authoritarianism) than 
before the 2010 democratic reforms. Whether democratic values have firmly established in 
Tongan society is moot, and requires a subjective analysis, which is attempted in the final 
part of the third section. The final section concludes.  
1. What is ‘Democracy’? 
m i n i m a l  d E f i n i t i o n 
Dahl (1971) said that democracy has two fundamental requirements: the right to contest 
the conduct of a government and the right to participate in that contest (and therefore 
in the control of the government). Dahl termed societies that gave these rights to a vast 
bulk of its citizens ‘polyarchies’. Democracy, according to Dahl, boils down to the right 
to complain about the government and the right to try to do something about it. This 
minimal definition of democracy considers only the conduct of government, and not the 
surrounding apparatus needed to ensure democratic government continues to function. 
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m a x i m a l  d E f i n i t i o n 
Sen (1999) expanded upon the Dahlian concept of democracy. He argued that democracy 
must not be equated solely with majority rule, but it must be conceived of as a set of values. 
Democracy requires “the protection of liberties and freedoms, respect for legal entitle-
ments, and the guaranteeing of free discussion and uncensored distribution of news and fair 
comment” (Sen 1999, 10). Democracy, according to Sen, must enable participation in the 
political life of one’s community, provide a vehicle for people to propose and support their 
claims for political attention, and encourage citizens to learn from one another to inform a 
society’s practices and values. 
The concept of democracy as a set of values gives rise to the question of causality: does 
democracy as a rules-based system foster democratic values, or do a society’s democratic 
values foster a rules-based democratic system? More importantly, in the context of devel-
opment, is it too much to expect societies unfamiliar with democracy and its values to 
achieve its maximal definition, as provided by Sen, in order to be said to have ‘achieved’ 
democracy? It most likely is, but a strict reliance on a Dahlian definition of democracy 
enables ‘hybrid-regimes’, those whose political systems lie somewhere between author-
itarianism and democracy (Horner and Power 2009), to claim to be democratic when in 
fact their leaders merely pay lip service to democracy’s values. A more realistic definition 
lies somewhere between the two approaches, though the maximal definition of democracy 
remains the one that democracy’s proponents must aim to achieve. 
d E m o c R at i c  t R a n s i t i o n 
Schedler (1998) states that there are three stages of democracy: electoral; liberal; and 
advanced. A country that has electoral democracy has some but not all of the attributes 
considered necessary for a ‘true’ democracy. It holds elections, but fails to uphold all of 
the political and civil rights necessary for the functioning of liberal democracy, in essence 
a ‘hybrid-regime’. A liberal democracy holds regular elections and ensures citizens’ polit-
ical and civil rights are upheld. This equates more to Dahl’s conception of democracy. 
Schedler does not describe the attributes of an advanced democracy, other than to say 
that it demonstrates attributes beyond the minimum required of a liberal democracy. It 
is perhaps more akin to Sen’s conception of democracy. The third category is arguably 
irrelevant depending on one’s understanding of civil and political rights. If such rights 
are sufficiently broad then it could be argued that a democracy needs nothing more than 
their protection to properly function. Schedler states that a democratic transition occurs 
when a country moves from either authoritarian rule or electoral democracy to a liberal or 
advanced democracy. Transforming from an authoritarian rule to an electoral democracy 
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is not considered a democratic transition on the basis that an electoral democracy has not 
fulfilled the requirements of democracy, and is therefore more like a semi-democracy. 
Resnick (2012, 1) defines a democratic transition differently. She defines a democratic tran-
sition as a “shift from one party to a multi-party environment and the holding of regular elec-
tions”, which is akin to Schedler’s characterisation of an electoral democracy. Schedler’s 
definition appears more appropriate, if one agrees with Dahl and Sen’s conception of 
democracy, which both require the right to participate in regular elections. Resnick’s 
definition encounters further difficulty by referring to a ‘multi-party environment’. In 
many non-Western countries there is no tradition of political parties. To include a ‘multi-
party environment’ as part of the definition of democracy implies that political parties 
are necessary for democracy to function, which is a narrow, Western-centric approach to 
government. 
d E m o c R at i c  c o n s o l i d at i o n 
Democratic consolidation, according to Schedler, means to avoid democratic breakdown 
and democratic erosion. Democratic breakdown is defined as “dramatic, sudden, and 
visible relapses to authoritarian rule” (Schedler 1998, 97), such as in Fiji since the 2006 
coup d’etat. Democratic erosion, on the other hand, is akin to death by a thousand paper-
cuts. It is a slow transformation back to authoritarian rule through the marginalisation of 
democratic ideals and principles, often by those elected to lead. The recent curtailment of 
the right to protest at sea in New Zealand is a vivid example of democratic erosion in one of 
the world’s established democracies. A consolidated democracy is therefore a democracy 
that appears secure now and into the future. 
Resnick goes further than Schedler and states that democratic consolidation means 
“avoiding ‘erosion’, evidenced by a slow, gradual shift to a hybrid regime between liberal 
democracy and dictatorship and ‘deepening democracy’, which involves guaranteeing 
human rights, creating a level playing field for party competition, and adhering to constitu-
tional divisions of powers” (Resnick 2012, 1). Her definition implies that democratic consol-
idation is a gradual shift towards Schedler’s advanced democracy. It reconciles better with 
the word ‘consolidate’, which means to strengthen or reinforce. Schedler’s definition does 
not require a strengthening, but could be satisfied by stagnation. 
m E a s u R E s  o f  d E m o c R a c y 
Following attempts to define democracy, many scholars have considered approaches to 
measure the ‘democratic’ nature of an individual society. The Centre for Systemic Peace 
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measures democracy using the Polity IV scores, the fourth iteration of the Polity index that 
was first introduced in 1975. Polity IV ranks governance on a scale between autocracies and 
democracies. Anocracies (akin to the previously discussed ‘hybrid-regimes’), which display 
characteristics of both autocracy and democracy, lie in between. Three areas are examined 
to determine a country’s Polity IV score: the competitiveness and openness of executive 
recruitment; the constraints on the executive; and the regulation and competitiveness 
of political participation. Numerical scores are assigned to a country for its performance 
in each area, which are used to determine where it sits on the governance continuum. 
(Marshall and Cole 2011; Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2011) 
Another commonly used measurement, Freedom House, is not a measure of democracy 
exactly, but rather a measurement of the ‘freedom’ enjoyed by citizens. Two aspects make 
up its assessment; political rights and civil liberties. Most relevant to this thesis are the 
political rights, which are similar to the Polity IV measures. Freedom House analyses the 
political rights of a country in three broad categories: electoral process; political partici-
pation and pluralism; and the functioning of the government. Like the Polity IV scores, 
countries are assigned numerical scores that demonstrate whether they are ‘free’, ‘partly 
free’, or ‘not free’. (Puddington 2013) 
Informed by Dahl’s conception of democracy, Vanhanen (2000) developed a third dataset 
for its measurement. Democracy, according to Vanhanen, can be measured by the support 
for a country’s largest political party and the percentage of its citizens that cast a vote. 
Vanhanen claimed that his approach is superior because unlike the established Freedom 
House and Polity measures it relies on just two objective criteria, not a raft of subjective 
measures. 
The measures are not definitive and are open to debate. Casper and Tufis (2003) point out 
that while the three most commonly used measures of democracy – Polity IV, Freedom 
House, and Vanhanen’s approach – are correlated, they should not be assumed to be inter-
changeable. Their study found that the three measures gave markedly different results 
when subject to the same alterations in variables. While Vanhanen’s criticism of the Polity 
and Freedom House measures as being too subjective is valid, the simplicity of his measure 
is equally open to debate. Vanhanen’s logic would find that a country with a popular ruling 
political party, as is the case in New Zealand at the time of writing (2014), less democratic 
than another with a more even spread of support between its political parties, as in the 
United Kingdom or Canada. It also does not take into account the proliferation of political 
parties that are often established and gain support in fledgling democracies, or in coun-
tries that have a more proportional system of representation. 
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2. A Working Definition of Democracy 
Voter participation is a measure of democracy with which it is difficult to find fault.16 Logic 
says that the fewer that people vote, the less representative the results. It is true that voter 
participation does not take into account issues such as voter apathy in established democ-
racies, the inevitability of results deterring voter participation, such as in the United States 
presidential elections, or poorly maintained electoral rolls. Greater voter participation, 
however, should logically lead to more diverse representation, as voter motivations are 
invariably diverse. Voter participation is therefore a reasonable measure of democracy, 
with the caveat that electoral systems can have a significant impact on pluralism. The 
competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment is important to the functioning of 
democracy, as an executive that is not at risk of losing office is hardly democratic at all, and 
is therefore also an appropriate measure of democracy. Constraints on the executive, taken 
into account by both the Polity IV and Freedom House measures, are necessary to ensure 
continued representation of the people, for without such constraints an executive would 
be free to legitimise non-democratic forms of rule. Constraints on the executive are there-
fore a third appropriate measure of democracy. 
A nebulous concept, democracy is easier to define than measure, though that is not to say 
that the former is an easy task. It requires more than simple majority rule, and includes the 
right to participate in the contest of ideas that is necessary in a democracy. Importantly, 
it is a set of values not rules, though too much emphasis on the values of democracy can 
place too high expectations on countries unfamiliar with its nuances and lead to unpro-
ductive questions about its ‘success’. Democracy is a staged process, though clear bound-
aries between stages are rarely obvious. Measuring democracy is fraught and largely relies 
on subjective analyses. An assessment of the three most common forms of measurement 
shows that each is imperfect. Combining elements of each measurement, this chapter 
contends that democracy is best assessed by measuring a country’s level of voter partici-
pation, considering the manner in which its executive is recruited and the constraints that 
are placed upon that executive. 
16 It must be noted that compulsory voting requirements, such as in Australia, add a complication to this 
measure. Where options exist to express dissatisfaction with candidates through spoiling the ballot or 
otherwise, in essence a ‘no-confidence vote’, it could be legitimately argued that those results are more 
democratic than outcomes from voluntary elections. If there is no such ‘no-confidence’ option, or knowledge 
of the ability to enter such an option is not widespread, then there are clearly issues with voter participation 
as a measure of democracy. 
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3. Democracy in Tonga 
Tonga’s political system, both before and after the reforms of 2010, is unique among the 
nations not just of the Pacific, but of the world. Its democratic transition has occurred in 
stages, beginning in the nineteenth century and continuing through to the 2010 reforms 
and possibly beyond. The 2010 reforms opened up the executive to competition, which is 
no longer comprised solely of monarchical appointments, nor has any such appointees. 
The 91% participation rate in the 2010 election17 is high by international standards, and the 
challenge for Tonga and its politicians is to maintain those high rates once the novelty of 
the new electoral system wears off. Tonga had many elements considered vital to democ-
racy prior to the reforms of 2010: an independent judiciary willing to uphold the rights 
guaranteed in the Tongan Constitution; a relatively free and independent media; and 
regular elections, albeit for representatives that were not able to meaningfully influence 
the daily operations of an unelected executive. A democratic contradiction prior to 2010, 
Tonga was perhaps best described by one prominent New Zealand politician as a “partially 
feudal, partially democratic” state. The question of whether the values of democracy have 
firmly established in Tongan society is debatable, leaving question marks as to whether 
Tonga has truly become ‘democratic’. 
t o n g a’s  d E m o c R at i c  t R a n s i t i o n 
This thesis contends that Tonga’s 2010 democratic reforms represent the third stage of 
democratic transition that began in the nineteenth century. The foundations for Tonga’s 
transition to democracy were laid in 1862 with the emancipation of all Tongans. Regular 
elections have been held since the passage of the 1875 Constitution, albeit for People’s 
Representatives who had minimal influence on the affairs of the Tongan Government until 
the 2010 reforms. The period between the 1862 emancipation of Tongans and the promul-
gation of the 1875 Constitution that established regular elections represents the first stage 
of the Tongan democratic transition. The second stage of Tonga’s democratic transition 
occurred in 1960 when  women were granted the right to vote. That very little has been 
written about the 1960 introduction of women’s suffrage is a shame, as Tonga was ahead of 
all of its Pacific neighbours except New Zealand in this regard.18 
The 2010 democratic reforms therefore represent the third stage of Tonga’s democratic 
transition. The Tongan people still only elect seventeen of twenty-six seats in Parliament, 
17 This figure was confirmed in conversations with Pita Vuki, Tonga’s Supervisor of Elections and Electoral 
Commissioner in September 2013. 
18 Australia did not grant full federal voting rights to Aboriginals until 1962, some 60 years after non-Aboriginal 
women were granted the right to vote. 
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the remaining nine being set aside for the hereditary title-holding nobles, but unlike 
before 2010, the People’s Representatives now have a majority in Parliament. It is indic-
ative of the fractious nature of the People’s Representatives as well as the reverence held 
by many to hereditary leaders in Tonga that Lord Tu’ivakanō, a noble, was elected Prime 
Minister following elections in 2010. It is quite possible that Tonga will experience further 
democratic transitions in the future, as its citizens call for further democratisation of the 
political process, just as New Zealand did in the 1990s when it introduced a proportional 
system of voting. 
E x E c u t i v E  R E c R u i t m E n t 
Executive recruitment is more open and competitive following the reforms of 2010. 
The Prime Minister must be an elected member, Nobles’ or People’s Representative, of 
Parliament. He or she is appointed by the Monarch to the position of Prime Minister 
following the will of Parliament, which is decided through secret ballot. The Prime 
Minister is then given the responsibility of recommending to the Monarch who will be 
appointed to Cabinet from the elected representatives of Parliament. There is provision, 
however, for the Prime Minister to appoint up to four Ministers to Cabinet from outside 
the elected MPs. Those appointed from outside the elected MPs are then appointed to 
Parliament, but the majority of Cabinet must be comprised of elected MPs. At the time of 
writing, Cabinet is comprised of four Nobles’ Representatives, six People’s Representatives, 
and two outside appointees. (Campbell 2011; Powles 2012) 
c o n s t R a i n t s  o n  t h E  E x E c u t i v E 
Parliament has been empowered to act as a constraint on executive power. Cabinet must 
not number a majority in Parliament, meaning that some support from non-Cabinet 
MPs is required for the passage of all laws. Parliamentarians are entitled to call for votes 
of no confidence in the Government during defined periods, with Ministers appointed 
from outside Parliament ineligible to vote. As the head of state, the Monarch retains his 
or her right of veto to legislation put before him or her by Parliament, a measure retained 
from the former system as a constraint on the lawmaking ability of Parliament (Powles 
2012). Notably the right to amend the Constitution requires a simple majority in the 
Parliament. The requirement of just a simple majority to amend the Constitution is signif-
icant as it conceivably gives the People’s Representatives, who outnumber the Nobles’ 
Representatives by seventeen to nine, substantial power over Tongan politics. 
Alongside the legislature, the media and the judiciary are in a position to hold the exec-
utive to account. Freedom of speech has been protected by the Constitution since its 
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promulgation, the caveat being that an independent media did not take root until the 
1980s and regularly faced barriers put in place by an establishment not used to public 
criticism. In particular, the Government’s actions in the early 2000s severely curtailed the 
freedom of the press, but the judiciary eventually overturned most of the Government’s 
restrictions on the basis that they were contrary to the principle of freedom of speech 
enshrined in the Constitution. The Tongan judiciary has played a strong role in restrain-
ing the actions of the executive. The judiciary was even-handed throughout the 1990s 
and 2000s, punishing proven criminal defamation while showing a willingness to 
uphold human rights in the face of significant Government opposition. There have been 
a number of notable judicial decisions since the late 1980s that upheld the supremacy of 
the Constitution and brought the ire of the establishment, indicating that judicial inde-
pendence has begun to take root, while ‘Akilisi Pohiva and other pro-democrats have been 
punished when their actions were found illegal. (Campbell 2011; Powles 2012) 
v o t E R  p a Rt i c i p at i o n 
Voter participation in Tonga historically is difficult to ascertain. Poorly maintained elec-
toral rolls and a lack of clear census data during the twentieth century transforms calcu-
lating voter participation in Tonga from a science into an art. Alongside the lack of official 
data, the People’s Representatives’ inability to adequately affect the decisions of the execu-
tive likely dissuaded many Tongans from taking part in elections. Campbell (2011) records 
voter participation in the elections from 1987-2008 as approximately 50% of the popula-
tion, which is not dissimilar to voting rates in many of the world’s established democra-
cies. Work began to improve the accuracy of the electoral roll prior to the 2008 election, 
and was further expanded in the lead up to the 2010 election. Participation in the 2010 
election was very high, with approximately 91% of eligible Tongans casting a vote. The high 
participation rate was likely due to a number of factors, not least of which being that the 
2010 election was the first held under the new system. Significant publicity in the lead up 
to the election undoubtedly encouraged many more Tongans to participate in 2010 than 
in the past. The challenge for Tonga and its politicians is to maintain such high participa-
tion rates once the novelty of its new electoral system wears off. The participation in next 
election, likely to be held in late 2014, will be an useful proxy indicator of how democracy 
has become established in Tonga. 
d E m o c R a c y  a s  a  s E t  o f  va l u E s 
Democracy, as noted above, is a set of values, not a set of rules. While noting concerns 
about burdening countries not used to democracy with unfair demands, its values must 
be considered in any assessment of democracy in an individual society. Constitutionally 
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guaranteed freedoms are worthless unless citizens are comfortable expressing themselves 
without fear of retribution and are not constrained by cultural norms. In short, if citizens 
are not able, or do not feel comfortable, taking advantage of their democratic rights, then 
it must be asked whether those citizens live in a democracy at all. A number of research 
participants noted that Tonga is democratic electorally, but certain democratic principles 
have not yet been properly understood. Others, including some that made the former 
point, suggested that the Tongan people would become more ‘democratic’ gradually, as 
they begin to understand the democratic values represented by the reforms of 2010. This 
latter point raises the question of causation mentioned earlier: do laws engender demo-
cratic values, or do democratic values engender democratic laws? Proponents of the view 
that the Tongan people will gradually begin to understand and adhere to democratic 
values clearly believe in the power of law to engender values. It is, of course, an entirely 
subjective analysis and suffers by defining the Tongan people as one, homogeneous 
society, but the concerns of many research participants indicate that their country’s people 
have not yet fully grasped the value of democracy. Further research, which is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, is necessary before any definitive conclusions are offered about 
whether Tongans have fully grasped the principles of democracy. 
i s  t o n g a  d E m o c R at i c ? 
Based just on the three measures of democracy this thesis argues are the most relevant 
– executive recruitment, constraints on the executive, and voter participation – Tonga 
clearly has more in common with democracies than authoritarian states. It is also clearly 
more democratic as result of the 2010 reforms. Voter participation in the 2010 election was 
high. There are some clear constraints on the executive, in the form of Parliament, the judi-
ciary, and the media, though other institutions, such as local government or a government 
oversight body, are noticeably absent or significantly under-resourced. Executive recruit-
ment is now largely confined to elected representatives, though there is scope for the 
Prime Minister, who must be an elected member of Parliament, to appoint Ministers from 
outside the ranks of elected representatives. Noble representation remains, though the 
People’s Representatives have the capacity to reduce the influence of the nobles, should 
they become sufficiently unified to do so. Objectively, Tonga is relatively democratic, 
meeting a minimal definition of democracy. The subjective analysis – whether democ-
racy’s values pervade Tongan society – is not as simple, raising questions as to whether 
Tonga has fully met the maximal definition of democracy. 
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4. Conclusion 
Democracy is a concept that is not easy to define. A minimal definition is perhaps too 
easily met, a maximal definition perhaps too hard to attain, with a fair representation of 
democracy lying somewhere in between. Democracy is a process by stages, with transition 
preceding consolidation, each stage having its own unique characteristics. Its measure 
is a vexed issue. This thesis argues that voter participation, executive recruitment, and 
constraints on the executive are the three most important indicators of democracy. Tonga 
measures strongly on the indicator of voter participation, slightly less so on executive 
recruitment and constraints. It meets a minimal version of democracy, but questions 
remain as to whether Tonga can be considered a democracy in the maximal sense. The 
next chapter considers democracy more specifically in the development context, and 
assesses the different approaches used by donor countries to try and foster democracy in 
societies where it has yet to fully take root. 
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VI. Democracy in the 
Context of Development 
Having considered the general concept of democracy, this chapter analyses democracy 
in the specific context of development. The first section offers a historical account of how 
the consideration of democracy in the context of development has evolved. Initial ideas 
about democracy in the development context in the post-war years were heavily influ-
enced by modernism, before geopolitical concerns meant that democracy largely slipped 
off the radar in the 1960s and 1970s. When democracy promotion reappeared following 
the end of the Cold War as part of the good governance agenda, it was generally separated 
from the wider development sector, though this gap has narrowed since the turn of the 
millennium. The second section of this chapter considers democracy assistance, broadly 
the support given by donors to foster or consolidate democratic openings in develop-
ing countries. Assistance has been provided in many different guises, including support 
for electoral and political processes, institution building, and assistance to civil society, 
though the emphasis has often been on the former. Its success is difficult to assess, though 
some patterns have emerged and lessons learned. The third section considers the issue of 
democracy in the specific context of the developing Pacific. The final section concludes. 
1. The Evolution of Ideas about Democracy in the Context 
of Development 
m o d E R n i s m 
Early modernist thinking in the 1950s saw the establishment of democracy as one of the 
final stages on the development continuum. Lerner (1958) theorised that societies develop 
in three stages. First comes urbanisation, necessary to support industrialisation, which is 
crucial in the modern economy. Following urbanisation is a rise in literacy rates, as more 
literate workers are needed to function in an industrialising economy. Closely linked to 
the rise in literacy is the rise of media, newspapers, radio, television, and films, which 
helps speed the spread of literacy. Finally, an informed and literate population would 
develop the mechanisms of greater societal participation, such as contestable politics. 
Lipset (1959) contended that democracies have higher levels of wealth, industrialisation, 
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urbanisation, and education than countries that are ruled under other forms of govern-
ment. Development theorists and practitioners, informed by Lipset and his modernist 
contemporaries, introduced a ‘sequencing’ approach to development and democracy 
(Carothers 1999). Overseas aid policies from the West during this early period focused on 
the four pillars of economic development identified by Lipset – wealth, industrialisation, 
urbanisation, and education – under the belief that once those prerequisites were met 
democracy would inevitably follow as the final stage of the ‘sequence’. 
t h E  c o l d  wa R 
By the late 1960s the modernist approach to development and democracy had largely 
fallen out of favour. The Cold War had heated up and it began to significantly impact the 
foreign policies of the West. Development was seen as a tool with which the spread of 
communism could be halted. Moreover, the economies of South-East Asia, many under 
authoritarian rule, were growing at rates faster than many of the world’s nascent democ-
racies. The growth of countries such as South Korea, China, and Singapore gave rise to the 
notion that developing countries needed strong authoritarian rule to facilitate necessary 
economic growth. These two factors – the Cold War and strong economic growth in coun-
tries under non-democratic rule – saw democracy largely disappear from donor discourse 
until it re-emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s. (Carothers 1999) 
g o o d  g o v E R n a n c E 
The late 1980s and the 1990s saw a renewed emphasis on democracy promotion under 
the guise of the good governance agenda (Hofheimer 2006). Weak institutions and polit-
ical systems were held accountable for poor economic development in many develop-
ing countries, and aid became conditional on reforms that were intended to strengthen 
the apparatus of the state, generally through the imposition of structural adjustment 
programmes. Considered merely an updated version of modernisation theory by some, the 
good governance agenda advocated for the adoption of Western approaches to governance, 
alongside neoliberal economic reforms (Murray and Overton 2011). Additionally, the fall of 
communism reduced the need to support dictatorships that were ‘friendly’ to the West. As 
such, democratic institutions, which were seen as mechanisms to improve the accounta-
bility of government, began to be promoted again within the good governance agenda. It is 
estimated that by 2000 governments and multinational organisations were spending US$2 
billion each year on programmes aimed exclusively at promoting democracy (Rakner et al. 
2007). 
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While democracy promotion fell under the guise of the good governance agenda, it is 
important to note that good governance extends beyond democratic institutions to the 
functioning of the state as a whole. An inherent tension exists between this broader 
objective and the promotion of democracy (Horner and Power 2009). Good governance 
programmes encouraged greater centralisation of power through the bolstering of the 
public sector and other institutions of the state. The aim of democracy promotion, on the 
other hand, is arguably to undermine dominant state institutions and decentralise power, 
or at least spread it more equitably (Meyer and Schulz 2008). This tension encouraged a 
segregation between promoters of democracy and those who promoted the wider, conven-
tional development agenda, which only began to close in the 2000s (Carothers 2004). 
d E m o c R a c y  a i d  v  d E v E l o p m E n t  a i d 
When democracy aid first became widespread in the late 1980s, its practitioners operated 
in silos distinct from the wider development sector and were often mistrustful of its 
motives and goals (Carothers 2004). In the 1990s a more integrated approach between the 
two forms of assistance – democracy aid and development aid – began to be considered 
possible and valuable. Bi-lateral development agencies began contributing significant 
sums to democracy promotion and to NGOs that were overtly pro-democratic in the belief 
that citizen activism was the key to ‘unlocking’ democracy (Rakner et al. 2007). The gap 
between democracy promoters and general development practitioners narrowed further in 
the 2000s, as each began to accept the importance of the other’s work. 
Democracy aid is defined by Resnick as aid “designed to promote greater liberalisation in a 
country that has already experienced a democratic transition” (Resnick 2012, 1). Similarly, 
Carothers defines democracy aid as “aid specifically designed to foster a democratic opening 
in a non-democratic country or further a democratic transition in a country that has experi-
enced a democratic opening” (Carothers 1999, 6). Development aid is defined as any aid that 
is designed to further socio-economic goals. An argument could be made that this much 
broader and inclusive definition encompasses the more targeted and specific democracy 
aid. Resnick, however, goes on to state that an inherent tension exists between democ-
racy aid and wider development aid as while the latter “may see the [recipient] government 
as a critical partner, democracy aid may view the [recipient] government as a hindrance” 
(Resnick 2012, 2). 
The initial separation between development and democracy aid was in part due to organ-
isational constraints. Early providers of democracy aid were often located outside the 
bounds of donors’ official aid programmes. Conceptionally, there were differences too. 
Democracy promoters saw their goal as intrinsically good. They relied on the logic that, 
as the world’s most prosperous nations are democratic, introducing democracy to the 
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developing world would inevitably lead to economic development there too, a reversal of 
modernist sequence. Outside of the democracy promotion bubble, however, the belief in 
the modernist ‘sequencing’ approach remained widespread. There were suspicions that 
general development practitioners preferred to deal with authoritarian rulers to promote 
their development goals, under the impression that developing countries were not yet 
‘ready for democracy’. Democracy promoters disdained the general development prac-
titioner’s approach to partnering with host-country governments, who they often saw as 
part of the problem of governance, and instead preferred to challenge their entrenched 
hold on power. (Carothers 2004) 
t h E  a i d  E f f E c t i v E n E s s  a g E n d a 
The boundaries between democracy aid and development aid blurred during the 1990s 
and 2000s as the implementation of good governance policies failed within unaccount-
able governments. The age of the aid effectiveness agenda began in the late 1990s, which 
largely continued the policies of the good governance era but with an emphasis on country 
ownership to encourage greater accountability and therefore aid effectiveness. The culmi-
nation of the aid effectiveness agenda was the Paris Declaration of 2005, which placed 
(recipient) country ownership at the centre of the aid relationship, supported by donor 
harmonisation and donor alignment with (recipient) countries’ priorities. Democracy is 
not explicitly referred to in the Paris Declaration, and only warrants one mention in its 
successor Accra Agenda for Action. Its absence likely owes to the realpolitik of securing 
global support for the Paris Declaration, including support from many non-democratic 
states. (Horner and Power 2009) 
As the drive for accountability sped up, it became clear that politics could not be avoided, 
and aid that is targeted at greater accountability inevitably fosters democratic ends. The 
response of the West (and particularly that of the United States) to the attacks on the World 
Trade Towers in 2001 led to a clear delineation between ‘evil’ non-democratic states and 
‘friendly’ democratic nations. Several wars were fought under the pretext of bringing 
democracy to undemocratic states. In the Pacific, policy-makers in Australia and New 
Zealand, whose fears were exacerbated by the 2002 Bali bombings, began to fret about 
an ‘arc of instability’ in the region (Murray and Overton 2011). The spread of democracy 
became a key foreign policy objective, which was mirrored in the development policies 
of the West (Carothers 2006). A backlash to the pro-democracy policies of the West, and 
in particular those of the Bush and Blair administrations in the United States and United 
Kingdom respectively, embroiled as they were in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, was inevi-
table. Of concern to democracy promoters, the backlash came not just from those countries 
that saw the policies as a threat, but also from many Westerners themselves, who disliked 
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the bluster and, at times, blatant warmongering that accompanied the pro-democratic 
cries from their politicians (Carothers 2010). 
2. Democracy Assistance 
Broadly speaking, democracy assistance fits into three categories: support for electoral 
and political processes; institution building; and support for civil society (Rakner et al. 
2007). Donors have also attempted to use conditionality to foster democracy in developing 
countries, with varying degrees of success. A political economy approach to democracy 
assistance emphasises increased accountability and citizen participation. As practised, 
there have essentially been two approaches to democracy assistance: a political approach 
that focuses on the contest for power; and a developmental approach that sees democracy 
as an inevitable, incremental transition. Of paramount importance is domestic demand 
for democratic government, without which there is little prospect of democracy assistance 
achieving its goals. 
Before considering the forms of democracy assistance that donors have used, it is neces-
sary to consider exactly what is meant by ‘democracy assistance’. Bjørnlund (2004) defines 
international democracy assistance as practical efforts to encourage, support, or influence 
democratic change or political reform in another country. The focus of democracy assis-
tance varies according to where the recipient country lies on the democratic continuum 
(Carothers 2010). Early on in a democratic transition, the emphasis is on providing support 
for human-rights activists, nascent political parties, election observation, and demo-
cratic civic education. Once a new democracy reaches the consolidation phase, the role 
changes to focus on strengthening civil society and state institutions, particularly those 
associated with rebalancing power in the state, such as the judiciary, legislature, and local 
government. 
E l E c t o R a l  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  p R o c E s s E s 
The most obvious and widespread form of democracy assistance is that provided to elec-
toral and political processes. Technical and financial support provided by donors for 
conducting elections is commonplace throughout the developing world, and is considered 
beneficial by most commentators and practitioners, though concerns have been raised 
about creating unsustainable forms of democracy that require continual donor support 
to function (Ottaway and Chung 1999). It is important that donors look beyond election 
day, and view democracy as a process that does not begin and end with popular elections, 
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making sure that the capacity to conduct elections is established in domestic institutions 
not just individuals. Rakner et al. sum up the concerns of many commentators when they 
state that “there is a growing recognition that the holding of elections alone does not offer a 
cure for the deeper political and social problems besetting states in many developing coun-
tries” (Rakner et al. 2007, 11). 
Election monitoring is another common and highly visible form of electoral assistance 
(Rakner et al. 2007). Its worth is questionable. There are no international standards to 
which election monitors must adhere. It is difficult to envisage monitors, often politi-
cians themselves and usually parachuted into the country just days before elections are 
held, entering recipient countries without preconceived notions about the fairness of the 
election that they are set to monitor. Furthermore, it is condescending to send in election 
monitors where there is little evidence to support the supposition that an election might 
not be ‘fair’. Outrage would result if the tables were turned, and developing countries 
proposed sending monitors to oversee the elections of the world’s established democra-
cies. On the other hand, the international recognition that accompanies the approval of 
election monitors is likely to have tangible benefits for developing countries, or at least 
enable them to avoid negative outcomes. 
Support for political parties to engage in the political process is offered by some donors 
(Power 2008). The policy of the New Zealand Aid Programme is not to provide aid to 
political parties,19 but the Australian Aid programme does offer support to foreign political 
parties. The Australian Political Parties for Democracy Programme provides funding from 
the Australian aid budget to three domestic political parties: Labor; the Liberal Party; and 
the Australian Greens. The aim of the programme was “to strengthen democracy interna-
tionally by providing support to the international activities of Australia’s major political 
parties”,  much of which manifests in support for foreign political parties and movements 
(Australian Department of Foreign and Trade 2012). It is unclear whether the programme 
will survive the cuts to the Australian aid budget introduced by the recently elected Abbot 
Government. Similar programmes are provided by the United States and a number of 
European countries. Rakner et al. (2007) argue that the durability of political parties is 
crucial to the success of democracy, but, as noted in the previous chapter, this Western-
centric view of democracy fails to take into account cultures that have no history of politi-
cal parties. The fact that democracy has only ‘succeeded’ in the past with political parties 
at its core does not imply that it cannot succeed without political parties, which raises 
questions about the desirability of supporting political parties in the development context. 
19 This policy was confirmed by several current and former New Zealand diplomats and development 
practitioners. 
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i n s t i t u t i o n  b u i l d i n g 
The second broad category of democracy assistance is institution building (Rakner et al. 
2007). The aim of institution building is to ensure that the rule of law – which, at its core, is 
the equality of all before the law – is upheld and emphasised. Central to this approach has 
been support for judiciaries, which have been viewed by donors as an important constraint 
on the excesses of executive government. Support for the police force is important too, as 
it is the body that is responsible for enforcing the laws in an even-handed manner. Donor 
support for parliaments has not been as forthcoming, despite its role as a constraint on the 
power of the executive. Power (2008) notes that support for parliaments must be driven 
by the demands and needs of the recipients, not the donors. He states it is important that 
recipients have as much (if not more) interest in the success of donor support for institu-
tions as the donors, otherwise the support is likely to be ineffective. 
c i v i l  s o c i E t y  a n d  t h E  m E d i a 
Support for civil society represents the third pillar of democracy assistance. Donor support 
to civil society grew in the 1990s, coinciding with the growth of civil society in many devel-
oping countries, as it filled the gap left by governments reformed and reduced under the 
tenets of neoliberalism. Civil society has often been responsible for providing civic educa-
tion, the proliferation of which has been shown to encourage participation in, and improve 
the fairness of, electoral processes (Rakner et al. 2007). Civil society is seen as crucial to 
increasing citizens’ capacity to monitor the activities of the state. An independent media is 
also vital to monitor the state and many donors provide training to media organisations in 
developing countries (Meyer and Schulz 2008). The authors raise concerns, however, that 
establishing a liberalised media without the necessary institutional framework in which 
the media operate can exacerbate social divisions. It is well understood that the perfor-
mance and independence of the fourth estate is crucial to the success of democracy, and it 
is vital to ensure that it is not hijacked by partisan interests to the detriment of the wider 
citizenry.  
c o n d i t i o n a l i t y 
Donors have attempted to use conditionality –  making the provision of aid dependent on 
meeting certain conditions –  to encourage democratisation in the developing world, with 
varying degrees of success. Levitsky and Way (2005) state that linkage with the West, rather 
than leverage, has had a greater impact on the likelihood of democratisation in developing 
countries. Linkage is defined as a developing countries ties to the West, and is primarily 
dictated by geography, while leverage manifests in diplomatic pressure, sanctions, or, in 
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the worst case, military intervention. The authors conclude that developing countries with 
the highest degree of linkage with the West are more likely to successfully transition to 
democracy than those with low degrees of linkage. 
Donor conditionality is governed by the Paris Declaration, which states that any conditions 
attached to aid must align with the recipient country’s national priorities (OECD 2005). At 
first glance, this appears problematic for donors that wish to attach democratic conditions 
to aid, but an exception was placed in clause sixteen of the Paris Declaration to legitimise 
conditions that are contrary to a government’s national priorities if there is ‘sound justifi-
cation’ for such conditions. Encouraging democratisation appeals as something that would 
likely meet a ‘sound justification’ test. Limiting the impact of conditionality has been the 
inconsistent response of donors to democracy and human rights breaches, which are often 
dictated more by geopolitical interests than by principle. (Horner and Power 2009) 
p o l i t i c a l  E c o n o m y  a p p R o a c h 
Using a political economy approach, Meyer and Schulz (2008) argue that promoting 
democracy in the context of development means increasing domestic accountability, 
which can be done in three ways: improving state transparency and public access to 
information; increasing political participation beyond formal participation in elections; 
and making the state more answerable and culpable for its actions. The authors state that 
citizen participation can be increased in two ways, either through poverty alleviation 
programmes, which they argue have the inevitable logic of increasing citizen participation, 
or directly through democracy promotion programmes that aim to increase state account-
ability and citizens’ capacity to monitor the state.  
d E v E l o p m E n ta l  v  p o l i t i c a l  a p p R o a c h E s 
Carothers (2009) states that there are essentially two approaches to democracy assistance: 
political and developmental. The political approach to democracy assistance focuses on 
the contest for power and assisting as many actors to take part in that contest as possible. 
The developmental approach to democracy assistance sees democracy as an incremental 
process that is part of the broader concerns of equality and justice. Programmes without 
clear ‘democracy’ objectives, such as improving the education quality, make up the 
developmental approach, as they rely on the logic that a healthier, wealthier, and more 
educated populace will inevitably call for greater democratisation. This logic, mirroring 
early modernist thinking and based on past experiences in the West, is open to debate. 
The improvement of the health, wealth, and education of some in non-democratic states, 
49
China in particular, without a corresponding move toward democracy, calls into question 
this logic. 
d o m E s t i c  d E m a n d  f o R  d E m o c R a c y 
Most commentators agree that domestic demand for democracy is crucial for the success-
ful democratisation of any country. Rakner et al. state that although “external factors can 
play a significant role in shaping the preferences and relative bargaining positions of key 
domestic actors”, the will to reform must come from domestic political actors (Rakner et 
al. 2007, 10). Iraq offers a clear example of the limitations of one form of democracy assis-
tance; military intervention. Despite the so-called ‘Coalition of the Willing’ assisting Iraqi 
democrats into positions of power, the domestic demand for democracy was not present, 
for reasons nefarious or otherwise, and the Iraqi people are yet to fully accept democracy 
as a form of government. 
Alongside domestic demand for democratic government, Horner and Power (2008) note 
that successful democracy assistance must be tailored the political context of the recipi-
ent country. The authors stress that there exists no ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to democ-
racy assistance and that past success in one context is no guarantee of future success in 
another. The importance of context is not an issue unique to democracy assistance, but 
one that confronts development practitioners in all sectors. Professional churn, where 
practitioners move from one country to another in a short space of time, is a major contrib-
utor to this problem. The authors argue that the greater weight that is given to domestic 
context, the more successful development programmes and democracy assistance are 
likely to be. 
t h E  i m p a c t  o f  d E m o c R a c y  a s s i s ta n c E  o n  d E m o c R at i c 
t R a n s i t i o n s 
The unique characteristics of developing countries make render it difficult to make clear 
links between aid and democracy in the context of development, regardless of whether the 
aid is specifically focused on democratic programmes or not. On the basis of a substantial 
assessment of democratic transitions in sub-Saharan Africa following the conclusion of 
WWII, Resnick (2012) concludes that aid impacted on democratic transitions in that conti-
nent in three ways: through the use of leverage; through the imposition of conditionality; 
and by facilitating inaugural elections. Each is expanded upon below. 
Resnick (2012) contends that threats by donors to withdraw aid helped foster democratic 
transitions in some African countries. The threats were particularly effective when made 
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in concert with other donors and in countries that were significantly under-developed, 
reliant on aid, and beset by internal crises. Rakner et al. (2007) reach a similar conclu-
sion, arguing that external forces attempting to foster democratic reform were likely to 
have more influence in low-income countries with governments that are heavily reliant 
on aid to function. Threatening a withdrawal of aid funding is clearly ethically prob-
lematic and runs roughshod over the principles of the Paris Declaration and successor 
agreements. It should be noted that the data that informs the conclusions of both Resnick 
(2012) and Rakner at al. (2007) is largely drawn from the pre-Paris Declaration develop-
ment paradigm. Whether donors are as willing now to threaten to withdraw aid is unclear, 
though the New Zealand Government’s recent decision to withhold funding for Tonga’s 
tourism sector due to the use of a Chinese aircraft (Arrow 2013) indicates that the with-
drawal of funding is still considered a viable option. 
Resnick (2012) concludes that economic conditionalities imposed by donors, often in the 
form of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), caused mass public movements against 
recipient countries, which in turn began democratic transitions. Essentially, the unpopu-
lar policies of structural adjustment programmes, such as privatisation and tax breaks for 
the wealthy, fostered popular protest movements in many countries that evolved into calls 
for more democratic government. This perverse outcome of SAPs was unlikely to have 
been initially anticipated the designers and proponents of SAPs, but it is perhaps the silver 
lining of a dark cloud that caused much pain throughout the developing world.  
The third of Resnick’s (2012) conclusions is that aid was used effectively to facilitate 
inaugural elections in countries that were inadequately resourced to facilitate these elec-
tions themselves. While noting the concerns about the funding of elections previously 
addressed in this chapter, ensuring the success of inaugural elections is important in the 
context of the continuing success of democracy. Elections are in effect the ‘shop window’ 
of democracy, and their success is vital to ensure the support of a citizenry that is unused 
to democracy as a form of government. 
t h E  i m p a c t  o f  d E m o c R a c y  a s s i s ta n c E  o n  d E m o c R at i c 
c o n s o l i d at i o n 
Democratic consolidation is necessarily a gradual process, without the clear signposts that 
accompany a democratic transition. In an age that requires development practitioners to 
provide tangible results, securing support for the direct purpose of democratic consoli-
dation is comparatively harder. Democratic consolidation requires an acceptance from 
all stakeholders that democracy is “the only game in town” (Rakner at al. 2007, 12), which 
requires support for the strengthening of institutions that uphold the rule of law – includ-
ing, but not limited to, the judiciary, parliament, and the police – to ensure a consistent 
51
playing field for democracy’s participants (Carothers 2010). Without such consistency, 
the unpredictable nature of democratic outcomes can be hijacked by groups that seek to 
remain in power or withhold power from another group. 
Przeworski and Limongi (1997) argue that economic development, while not important 
in relation to democratic transitions, has a significant effect on the continuing success 
of democracy. The heightened expectations that are often built up by democratic propo-
nents to garner popular support for democratic transitions mean that tangible benefits are 
necessary to prevent a popular revolt against democracy. To this end, the pivot of the New 
Zealand and Australian aid programmes toward economic development may prove useful, 
if spread equitably enough, in consolidating the nascent democracies of the Pacific. 
E x E c u t i v E  b i a s 
Rakner et al. (2007) and Horner and Power (2008) both argue that the tendency of donors 
to support incumbent regimes and rely on agreements made solely with the executive 
branch of government has the potential to undermine democracy. This approach is 
arguably emphasised by the Paris Declaration, which calls for increased government 
ownership of development initiatives. Carothers (2010) suggests incorporating opposition 
parties into development consultations as a means of overcoming the executive bias. He 
argues that full participation in the consultation process would better anchor development 
initiatives to the needs of society. Donors are understandably wary about incorporating 
opposition figures in development consultations, just as incumbent governments in donor 
countries see little need to include opposition parties in their own policy deliberations. 
Though unlikely, a move toward a more consensus-based policy approach, both at home 
and abroad, would likely improve policy outcomes for those most directly affected. 
3. Democracy in the Pacific 
t h E  b i K E tawa  d E c l a R at i o n 
The majority of the Pacific nations are ostensibly democratic, with one or two notable 
exceptions. In 2000 the nations of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) agreed to the Biketawa 
Declaration, which promotes democratic principles. The Biketawa Declaration commits 
forum countries to upholding “democratic  processes and institutions which reflect national 
and local circumstances, including the peaceful transfer of power, the rule of law and the 
independence of the judiciary, just and honest government” (Pacific Islands Forum 2000, cl. 
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1(iii)). The Biketawa Declaration also sets out how the PIF should react to countries that 
fail to uphold those democratic principles. Options include measures aimed to restore 
the principles of democracy through dialogue, and in the failure of dialogue, through 
other “necessary targeted measures” (Ibid., cl. 2(iv)). New Zealand’s Prime Minister at the 
time, Helen Clark, is thought to have been instrumental in the signing of the Biketawa 
Declaration, which came soon after the 2000 Fijian coup d’etat (McGraw 2009). 
f o R E i g n  f o R m  o f  g o v E R n m E n t ? 
Concerns have been raised about the imposition of foreign forms of government on the 
Pacific nations, which may be contrary to the world view of the people of the Pacific. 
Henderson (2003) states that the legacy of colonialism in Pacific is the creation of artificial 
states in the region, which have foreign forms of government – democratic Westminster, 
adversarial systems – that differ significantly from indigenous forms of government. 
Furthermore, prior to independence the indigenous people of the Pacific were given little 
opportunity to take part in the governance of their artificially created states. Henderson 
states that foreign donors should avoid funding defence forces, and refrain from public 
lectures on the benefits of democracy and rebuking those countries that are not consid-
ered sufficiently democratic. He suggests that, when setting development policies, foreign 
donors should acknowledge the artificial imposition of a foreign form of government in the 
Pacific and the inevitability of difficulties arising from that imposition. 
Hassall (2010) notes similar concerns to Henderson. Hassall contends that the Westminster 
forms of government that have been imposed on Pacific states are contrary to Pacific 
notions of politics and society, and its leaders are seen as part of the problem rather than 
the solution. This disconnect – viewing leaders as part of the problem, not part of the 
solution – has caused widespread apathy in the Pacific about the actions of those respon-
sible for governing. Hassall pays particular attention to political parties in the Pacific, and 
states that the inevitably adversarial nature of the interactions between political parties is 
contrary to the world view of many people from the Pacific.  
t h E  c o m m o n w E a lt h 
Leask (2008) considers the work of the Commonwealth in promoting democracy in the 
Pacific. He praises the work of the Commonwealth, whose representatives have refused to 
resort to force (though, they would not have the power to resort to force should they have 
the desire) to resolve conflicts in the Pacific and who have shown a willingness to engage 
with countries not living up to the democratic ideals of the Commonwealth. Leask says 
that the Commonwealth’s engagement with regional bodies and civil society means that 
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its programmes and assistance are targeted to achieve the best outcomes. He says that the 
Commonwealth is highly regarded in the Pacific for its non-judgemental approach to local 
governments. 
4. Conclusion 
As this chapter demonstrates, the issue of democracy in the context of development has 
occupied policy-makers to varying degrees since at least the 1950s. Democracy support 
was initially based on the modernist theories that were fashionable in the 1950s and early 
1960s, disappeared somewhat during the 1970s and early 1980s, before re-emerging in 
the late 1980s under the good governance and aid effectiveness agendas. Democracy 
assistance takes several forms, including assistance to electoral and political processes, 
institution building, and support to civil society. The intangible nature of democracy 
means that the success of democracy assistance is difficult to assess, but commentators 
have attempted to find patterns and offer lessons from past experiences. Democracy in the 
Pacific was upheld by the 2000 Biketawa Declaration of the PIF, but some see it as a foreign 
form of government perhaps unsuitable to Pacific cultures. The next chapter specifically 
considers the democracy assistance provided to Tonga in the lead up to the 2010 demo-
cratic reforms, and assesses the impact of that assistance on the reform process.  
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VII. The Impact of Donors 
on Tonga’s Democratic 
Transition of 2010 
Following the consideration of donor support for democracy, this thesis now addresses its 
primary objective, an assessment of the impact of donors on Tonga’s democratic transition 
of 2010. This chapter is divided into four sections. The first three sections present informa-
tion gathered about three themes considered in interviews conducted in the Kingdom of 
Tonga and New Zealand from August-October 2013 with individuals that were involved in, 
or were close observers of, Tonga’s democratic transition in 2010 or events leading to the 
transition. Those three themes are: the actors or organisations that had the most impact 
on Tonga’s democratic transition; the major causes of the democratic transition; and what 
donors did to assist the democratic transition. Informed by the analysis of those three 
themes, the impact of donors on Tonga’s democratic transition is assessed and weighed in 
this chapter’s fourth section. The final section offers a conclusion on the overall impact of 
donors on Tonga’s democratic transition. All the information presented below was corrob-
orated by multiple participants (in most instances without prompting from the inter-
viewer), unless otherwise stated. 
1. Which Individuals or Organisations had the Most Impact 
on Tonga’s Democratic Transition? 
When asked which actors or individuals had the most impact on Tonga’s democratic tran-
sition, research participants were near unanimous in identifying King George Tupou V 
and ‘Akilisi Pohiva and the pro-democracy movement (PDM) as being the most important 
actors. Others, including former Prime Minister Feleti Sevele, the late Prince Tu’ipelehake, 
and Tonga’s religious leaders, were identified by some participants as being crucial at 
varying stages of the process leading up to the 2010 democratic transition. Notably absent 
from participants’ responses were foreign individuals or organisations. This absence 
perhaps indicates that the foreign influence on Tonga’s democratic transition was 
either minimal, acted under a cloak of shadow unbeknownst to many participants in, or 
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observers of, the democratic transition, or that participants were not willing to admit to the 
impact of foreign influence. 
t u p o u  V 
Though short, the reign of King George Tupou V (2006-2012) was particularly eventful. 
As previously noted, immediately following his coronation in 2005, Tupou V voluntarily 
elected to cede his power and act on the advice of the Prime Minister. Many participants 
stated simply that without the support of Tupou V the political reforms of 2010 would 
not have happened, or, at least, would not have been enacted as peacefully as they were. 
The unequivocal public support of Tupou V for political reform helped unite a country 
that was divided over the issue of reform and the future place of the Monarchy. It placed 
pressure on the nobles to support the reforms, who were naturally wary about any possible 
reduction of their influence over Tongan politics, but were equally wary to publicly 
disagree with Tonga’s revered King. 
In the years preceding his coronation, Tupou V had increasingly been the acting Regent 
as his elderly father, Tupou IV, regularly took ill and left Tonga for medical treatment. 
Although generally attributed to his father, a number of participants intimated that 
Tupou V was the driving force behind the decision to appoint elected People’s and Nobles’ 
Representatives to Cabinet. The decision shortly after to appoint Dr Feleti Sevele, a good 
friend of Tupou V, as the first People’s Representative to serve as the Prime Minister of 
Tonga was also said to have been largely due to the influence of Tupou V. It is important 
to note, however, that while many participants attributed this decision to Tupou V, those 
same participants noted that the proposal could not have been made without the consent 
of Tupou IV and that to paint Tupou IV as completely resistant to change would be unfair. 
The decision to appoint Sevele, who was intimately involved in the establishment of the 
PDM, as Prime Minister, as well as the decision to appoint the late Prince Tu’ipelehake to 
lead the National Committee on Political Reform, gave impetus to the reform movement. 
Externally, Sevele was considered the driving force for the reform process, while the late 
Prince Tu’ipelehake, the nephew of Tupou IV, was the first member of the royal family to 
meaningfully engage with the reform movement and played an important role in the 2005 
public service strikes. 
Questioned about Tupou V’s motivation for political reform, participants offered a number 
of different possibilities, ranging from personal through to pragmatic reasons. Tupou V 
was a bachelor with no heirs, and one participant suggested that reducing the power of the 
Monarch was made easier by the fact that Tupou V was not removing power from his own 
children. Additionally, Tupou V was thought by some participants to look unfavourably 
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upon the political nous of his brother and heir,20 and sought to implement measures to 
limit his brother’s power over Tongan politics. Others attributed Tupou V’s motivation to 
his understanding of geopolitical affairs. A learned and well-read man, Tupou V was said 
to have concluded that Tonga had little choice but to reform. Still others suggested that 
Tupou V saw the ‘writing on the wall’ that framed reform in Tonga as inevitable, with or 
without the support of the Monarch. In this scenario, Tupou V was said to seen his acqui-
escence to reform as crucial to ensure the continuing prestige of the Tongan royal family 
in a new political environment. The two most common motivations that participants were 
attributed to Tupou V were that he had concluded that Tonga was ‘ready’ for reform and 
that a failure to reform would threaten Tonga’s tenuous position in the global order. 
The passing of Tupou V in 2011 means that his motivations for reform are unlikely to ever 
be conclusively demonstrated. It is doubtful that one single reason drove Tupou V; it is 
more likely that he was motivated by a range of reasons. Of importance to this thesis is the 
fact that no participants, from within and outside of Tonga, attributed external forces as a 
key motivation for Tupou V to accede to political reform. One participant even suggested 
that external forces allowed Tupou V and his predecessors to remain in power longer than 
might otherwise have been the case, a premise that is given more consideration later in 
this chapter. Close observers of and participants in of Tongan politics were much more 
likely to conclude that domestic or personal forces encouraged Tupou V to support politi-
cal reform in Tonga. 
‘a K i l i s i  p o h i va  a n d  t h E  p R o - d E m o c R a c y  m o v E m E n t 
Alongside Tupou V, most participants identified ‘Akilisi Pohiva and the wider PDM as 
having a significant impact on Tonga’s democratic transition. One close observer of 
Tongan politics observed that the PDM was “the single most important organisation 
throughout the whole reform process”. Several participants commented that there would 
have been no political reform in Tonga if the protests led by leaders of the PDM had not 
taken place. The PDM was nearly universally attributed with bringing the issue of democ-
racy into the public discourse, and ensuring that it remained an important political issue 
through the 1990s and 2000s. Its leaders earned the trust of the Tongan people by exposing 
improper government actions in the 1980s and 1990s, which initially led to calls for greater 
accountability that evolved into a wider democracy movement in the 1990s. 
20 It was said by two different participants in separate interviews that Tupou VI was dissuaded by his brother, 
Tupou V, from running in the 2010 election as a noble on an anti-reform platform. Given the election was held 
under the reformed system, it is doubtful that Tupou VI could have overseen a return to the previous system 
of government. 
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Pohiva was identified by most participants as the leader of the PDM, though some stressed 
the importance of Feleti Sevele and Uliti Uata in its genesis and early work and the efforts 
of its first chief executive Lopeti Senituli in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Unquestionably, 
Pohiva is a divisive figure in Tongan politics. Successive positive election results since 
Pohiva entered Parliament in 1987 demonstrate significant public support, at least in 
his home region of Tongatapu, but the success of candidates that gain his endorsement 
indicates that his support is more widespread. Some participants noted that the confron-
tational approach that Pohiva increasingly adopted caused animosity not just amongst 
his opponents but also from his own allies. This approach led to rifts with other pro-dem-
ocrats in Tonga, notably the former Prime Minister Sevele, and likely cost Pohiva the 
opportunity to become Prime Minister in 2010. A number of participants said that Pohiva’s 
confrontational approach was contrary to the earlier strategy taken by the wider PDM. One 
participant suggested that Pohiva’s change in approach was in response to external media 
reports, which, in the fashion of modern reporting, sought to portray a saintly protagonist 
(Pohiva) battling an evil antagonist (the Tongan Monarchy). Others suggested, perhaps 
uncharitably, that Pohiva used democracy as an issue to maintain his own political power. 
The support of the churches for the PDM in the early 1990s was pivotal to its success in 
Tonga, a particularly religious country. Several participants said that the support of Bishop 
Finau of the Catholic Church and Reverend Havea of the Wesleyan Church in the early 
1990s helped legitimise the PDM in Tonga, contributing to its widespread support. The 
church leaders’ decision to support the PDM, which was in essence a challenge to an estab-
lishment of which the churches were a part, was attributed to the dubious actions of some 
members of the Tongan Government that were antithetical to Christian values. 
Like those of Tupou V, the motivations of Pohiva and other key pro-democracy leaders are 
difficult to conclusively ascertain, as many were unable or unwilling to take part in this 
research. Further muddying the waters is the fact that the PDM was comprised of a diverse 
range of individuals, each with their own unique motivations for political reform in Tonga. 
A homogeneous set of motivations is not possible to establish, though one key theme is 
apparent: there were very real concerns with the actions of those in power through the 
1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, and addressing those issues was the initial uniting force behind 
the disparate group of individuals that made up the PDM. 
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2. What were the Major Causes of Tonga’s Democratic 
Transition? 
Participants’ responses were more diverse when asked to identify the major causes of 
Tonga’s democratic transition, though clear patterns again emerged unprompted. Many 
participants attributed one or a mix of globalisation and migration, the inevitability of 
change, and the Tongan Government’s lack of accountability as the main causes of Tonga’s 
democratic transition. Indirect links to donors can be made to the first two of these causes, 
and are explored later in this chapter. 
g l o b a l i s at i o n  a n d  m i g R at i o n 
The experience of Tongans abroad, as well as the increase in the number of foreigners 
visiting Tonga, was identified by many participants as an underlying cause of Tonga’s 
democratic transition. Emigration since the 1970s has led to a significant increase in 
the number of Tongans living overseas, particularly in New Zealand, Australia, and the 
United States. The different cultures experienced by the Tongan diaspora and the Tongans 
who travel internationally, as well as those of foreign visitors to Tonga, were said to have 
affected how Tongans consider their own culture and government. Notably, the three 
leaders most commonly identified as contributing to Tonga’s democratic transition – 
Tupou V, ‘Akilisi Pohiva, and Feleti Sevele – all spent significant periods of time outside 
of Tonga while they were younger. Moves towards democracy in the Pacific region were 
also thought to have encouraged pro-democrats in Tonga. Others – though none whose 
personal histories allowed them to speak with any degree of authority on the matter – 
argued that New Zealand and Australia insisted on democratic reform in Tonga. 
t h E  i n E v i ta b i l i t y  o f  c h a n g E 
Some participants believed that Tonga’s democratic transition was simply an inevitable 
change. In a world becoming steadily devoid of ‘absolute monarchies’, the characterisation 
perhaps unfairly given to Tonga in the West, it became inevitable that Tonga would have to 
reform to maintain its position in the global order. Tonga’s participation in international 
bodies, such as the United Nations and World Trade Organisation, was said to have further 
underscored the rarity of its former governing arrangement. Others suggested that it was 
inevitable that an increasingly educated younger generation of Tongans with knowledge 
of world affairs would support calls for democratic reform. One participant pointed out 
that all governments, whether democratically elected or not, eventually lose the support of 
their citizens, and naturally the same thing happened to the former Government of Tonga. 
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t h E  t o n g a n  g o v E R n m E n t ’s  l a c K  o f  a c c o u n ta b i l i t y 
Perhaps the most commonly suggested cause of Tonga’s democratic transition was that 
Tongans became disaffected with the Government following its inability to address the 
public’s concerns about its conduct. Scandals that were often uncovered by leaders of 
the PDM and highlighted by a newly independent and free-spirited local media (the 
establishment of which was a crucial factor in Tonga’s democratic transition deserving of 
further research outside the scope of this thesis) reduced public faith in the Government. 
The leaders of the PDM successfully channelled the public’s growing antipathy with the 
Tongan Government into wider concerns about the system of government in Tonga, which 
led to an increase in support for the democratic cause. 
3. How Did Donors Assist Tonga’s Democratic Transition? 
When asked directly what donors did to assist Tonga’s democratic transition, participants 
provided a variety of answers that largely fell into five categories: political engagement; 
punitive actions; financial support; institution building; and other indirect actions. Each 
category is expanded upon below. 
p o l i t i c a l  E n g a g E m E n t 
Support from external politicians, particularly from New Zealand and Australia, was 
identified by a number of actors within Tongan politics as having a significant impact 
on Tonga’s democratic transition. The support manifested itself in different ways. Those 
working within the Tongan Government appreciated the public support offered by external 
politicians for the Tongan reform process, and were pleased with the reluctance of those 
politicians publicly criticise the process. Conversely, those agitating for reform were heart-
ened by donors’ public offers of financial and technical support for reform. A number of 
Tongan participants identified the deployment of New Zealand and Australian army and 
police personnel in the wake of the 2006 Nuku’alofa riots as a crucial demonstration that 
the those countries stood alongside the Tongan Government and supported its reform 
programme. 
In discussions with actors from within the New Zealand Government it became apparent 
that while the New Zealand Government supported democratic reform in Tonga, there 
was a firm belief that the reforms must be driven from within Tonga by Tongans them-
selves. In the period before Tonga announced a path toward reform, participants said 
that the New Zealand Government policy was to refrain from bullying or condescending 
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behaviour towards Tonga on the subject of democracy in the understanding that such 
behaviour would be counter-productive (although, as demonstrated below, this policy was 
not always followed). During that period New Zealand’s representatives encouraged the 
Tongan Government to consider the democratic developments of its neighbours, particu-
larly Samoa. While public criticism was to be avoided, participants with experience in the 
New Zealand and Tongan Governments made it clear that in private discussions between 
representatives of the two countries, New Zealand’s representatives voiced support for 
democratic reform. After the Tongan Government announced that it would work towards 
reforms, it became obvious that the New Zealand and Australian Governments were 
particularly concerned to ensure the success of those reforms. 
p u n i t i v E  a c t i o n s 
While participants claimed that the New Zealand Government policy was to avoid bullying 
Tonga towards democracy, it and the Australian Government took measures in the early 
2000s that were clearly contrary to that approach. As previously noted in chapter four, 
the New Zealand Government was publicly critical of the Tongan Government in the 
lead up to the 2002 elections, through comments made by the Assistant Foreign Affairs 
Minister, Matt Robson, which were echoed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Phil Goff, 
who added veiled threats about New Zealand’s assistance to Tonga. The following year, in 
2003, a report from New Zealand’s High Commissioner to Tonga between 1999-2001, Brian 
Smythe, was leaked to the New Zealand Herald (Young 2003). The report was condescend-
ing of the Tongan political system, the future King Tupou V, and the slow progress towards 
political reform. Research did not uncover who leaked the report, but it can be assumed 
that the few people that had access to the full report worked in the upper echelons the 
New Zealand Government. A third piece of public condescension from the New Zealand 
Government came in the form of a Select Committee report published by the Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee in 2005 (New Zealand Parliament 2005). The report 
raises concerns about the then non-democratic nature of the Tongan political system, 
human rights issues, and the business interests of several members of the Tongan royal 
family. 
The Australian Government took a more direct approach in an attempt to speed up politi-
cal reform in Tonga. One participant with an intimate knowledge of the Tongan-Australian 
relationship confirmed that between 2003-2005 Australia’s policy was to withhold 
increases to its aid allocation until reforms were enacted that would establish a more 
representative system of government. The policy was not changed until formal meetings 
took place between the Tongan Prime Minister and the Australian Foreign Minister. This 
research did not uncover any examples of New Zealand placing such conditions on its 
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assistance programme to Tonga, and several participants asserted that no such conditions 
were ever put in place. Additionally, some participants noted that the United States State 
Department regularly sent reports from its Suva office to Washington that were disparaging 
of the Tongan Government, which were succinctly described by one participant as “not 
very helpful”. 
f i n a n c i a l  s u p p o Rt 
Donors provided financial support to a number of Tongan institutions that were directly 
concerned with Tonga’s democratic transition. Institutions that received funding from 
external donors include the PDM, the National Committee on Political Reform, the 
Constitutional and Electoral Commission, the Royal Boundaries Commission, the Tongan 
Electoral Commission, and the Tongan Parliament. A civic education programme organ-
ised through the Office of the Tongan Prime Minister, prior to another overseen by the 
Tongan Electoral Commission, also received funding from donors. Each institution had its 
own unique influence on Tonga’s democratic transition, and the operations of most would 
likely have been curtailed without support from external donors. 
Of all the Tongan institutions that received funding from donors, the PDM, or its later iter-
ation as the Human Rights and Democracy Movement of Tonga,21 is the most interesting 
and elusive. The research conducted for this thesis could not conclusively prove that the 
PDM received funding from donors. Statements made independently by five participants, 
from both within and outside of the PDM and Tonga, that it received funding indicate a 
high probability that it indeed did. Campbell (2011), who was involved at times in the activ-
ities of the PDM, states that external funding was secured in the late 1990s to assist with 
a constitutional convention and enabled it to employ a full-time chief executive. He does 
not, however, state where that funding came from. One former member of the PDM stated 
that funding was provided to the PDM by an ‘international Christian organisation’, which, 
while narrowing the field, still leaves a not insignificant number of potential donors. 
Another close observer of Tongan politics indicated that, during its embryonic stages, 
the PDM received small amounts of funding from the New Zealand High Commission to 
conduct speaking tours and educational activities throughout Tonga. Participants with 
experience in New Zealand political and diplomatic circles, however, were clear that the 
policy of the New Zealand aid programme is not to support political parties, which the 
PDM is considered to be. One participant that was involved with the PDM during the first 
decade of the 2000s confirmed that the PDM applied for and was denied funding from the 
New Zealand aid programme on the basis of the policy to not support political parties. 
21 From here on referred to the acronym PDM. 
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Participants from New Zealand and Tonga confirmed that the New Zealand aid programme 
provided financial assistance to the National Committee on Political Reform (NCPR). 
The NCPR was the first body sanctioned by the Tongan Government to consider the issue 
of democratic reform, and its members, all of whom were Tongan, travelled throughout 
Tonga and visited ex-pat communities in New Zealand, Australia, and the United States to 
discuss political reform with Tongan citizens. Its ambit was deliberately broad to encour-
age wide engagement on the issue of political reform. Civil society engagement with the 
Tongan Government in the reform process was said to have begun with the NCPR, but 
participants raised concerns about its work. Unsurprisingly, given the polarisation of 
Tongan politics during the 1990s and early 2000s, participants noted that some pro-demo-
crats were mistrustful of the level of engagement of the NCPR and the weight it would give 
to opposing views in its final report. 
In 2008 the Governments of New Zealand, Australia, and Tonga agreed to establish a 
pooled fund to provide resources for political reform activities. Each government provided 
$1.5 million in their own currency to the fund. Participants from within the Tongan 
Government and the external governments confirmed that the Tongan Government only 
wanted to deal with the Australian and New Zealand aid programmes on the issue of polit-
ical reform. The United Nations Development Programme was said to have sought involve-
ment in the political reform process but was rebuffed by the Tongan Government. Other 
major donors, notably China, were unlikely to have been interested in supporting political 
reform. Some participants suggested that the Tongan Government’s desire to limit involve-
ment to just the New Zealand and Australian aid programmes was due to the special rela-
tionship between the three countries, owing to their proximity and the presence of signifi-
cant Tongan ex-pat communities in New Zealand and Australia. Many Tongan participants 
spoke about the special nature of the Tongan-New Zealand relationship in particular.22 
The funding for the Constitutional and Electoral Commission (CEC) came from the pooled 
fund established by the Governments of Tonga, New Zealand, and Australia. The CEC 
was required to provide the Tongan Parliament with a blueprint for a reformed Tongan 
political system that could be implemented in time for the 2010 elections. Given the 
extremely tight timeframe – the CEC was given less than one year to complete its task – it 
did an admirable job and the majority of its recommendations were enacted by Parliament 
without amendment. The consultation of the CEC with Tongan civil society was praised by 
some participants, and questioned by others, though its strict deadline meant that it likely 
consulted as much as possible. 
22 It is, of course, quite possible that this was merely to flatter the New Zealand researcher, though the 
prevalence of the observation in interviews would suggest otherwise. 
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The CEC was originally tasked with conducting a civic education programme on the 
proposed reforms , but it quickly became apparent that it would not have the time or 
resources to do so. It was decided to run a civic education campaign through an existing 
European Union programme for national reconciliation that was established in the wake of 
the 2006 riots (though the funding for the campaign was provided from the pooled fund). 
Organised jointly by Viliami Afeaki from the Prime Minister’s Office and Drew Havea of the 
Tongan Civil Society Forum (TCCF), the civic education campaign ran concurrently with 
the CEC process. The civic education campaign involved community meetings that largely 
focused on proposed changes to the recruitment of the legislature and the executive, but 
also addressed issues such as women’s representation, electorate boundaries, and, contro-
versially to some participants, the importance of making an informed vote. Community 
meetings were said to be poorly attended, with participation from attendees low. Notes 
from each meeting were complied by the TCCF and provided to the CEC, but it is unclear 
how much those notes informed the final recommendations of the CEC. 
The Australian aid programme provided funding and technical advisers to assist with 
the establishment of the Tongan Electoral Commission (TEC) in May 2010, which would 
manage the election later that year.23 The TEC organised another round of voter education, 
this time focusing on changes to the voting system. Publications were produced, as were 
radio and television programmes. Voter identification cards were provided to all eligible 
Tongan citizens. It is a testament to the staff and management of the TEC that its work 
drew no criticism from any participants in the research, despite the scale of the challenge 
of establishing an office and overseeing an election under new conditions in less than five 
months. 
A number of other activities that could be classified as technical assistance were provided 
for out of the pooled fund or separately by donors. The Royal Boundaries Commission 
received support to redraw Tonga’s electoral boundaries, a substantial challenge in an 
archipelago of more than 170 islands. The drafting of new legislation, as well as amend-
ments to the Constitution and existing legislation, was overseen by ex-pat New Zealander 
Neil Adsett, who later became Tonga’s Attorney-General. A Cabinet Office Manual was 
also drafted and published, and support given to the Office of the Clerk. While not strictly 
technical assistance, at the behest of the Tongan Government, a radio broadcast of Tongan 
Parliament began as debate on the recommendations of the CEC started. The broadcast 
continues to receive support from donors, and is an important tool to keep the Tongan 
public informed about the activities of its representatives. New Zealand and Australia also 
provided election monitors to oversee the 2010 elections. 
23 Elections were previously managed by the Prime Minister’s Office. 
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i n s t i t u t i o n  b u i l d i n g 
Donors supported and have continued to support a number of institutions that are respon-
sible for upholding the rule of law in Tonga. The judiciary has received assistance, for 
example the salary of the Chief Justice – a position that has not yet been held by a Tongan 
– has traditionally been covered by the New Zealand aid programme. Donors view the judi-
ciary as vital to ensure the maintenance of the separation of powers between the branches 
of government. Substantial support has also been given to the Tongan Police Force, in the 
wake of what donors considered as a failure in their duty to respond appropriately to the 
2006 Nuku’alofa riots. Gear and training are being provided in an ongoing programme, and 
the salary of the Police Commissioner is provided by the New Zealand aid programme. 
i n d i R E c t  a c t i o n s 
Alongside the more obvious programmes, a number of other donor initiatives were high-
lighted as having an indirect influence on Tonga’s democratic transition. New Zealand’s 
support for sustainable energy infrastructure was said to have taken the political tension 
out of a significant issue for Tonga. Donor support for education aims to improve the 
ability of schools to foster intelligent and responsible citizens, who are thought to be more 
likely to support more representative forms of government, while scholarships allow 
Tongan students to experience democratic cultures in countries such as New Zealand, 
Australia, the United States, and Japan. Conversely, the immigration policies of other 
countries were highlighted as providing a ‘safety valve’ for the Tongan Government, 
limiting calls for reform. Donor government immigration policies enabled Tonga to avoid 
higher levels of unemployment, particularly youth unemployment, and the disaffection 
that traditionally accompanies disengaged young people, while also encouraging educated 
Tongans, those thought more likely to support reform, to emigrate. 
4. What Impact Did Donors Have on Tonga’s Democratic 
Transition? 
Using the information set out in the preceding three sections, the following section 
assesses the impact that donors had on Tonga’s democratic transition, the primary objec-
tive of this thesis. Each of the three themes is analysed, culminating in an overall assess-
ment of the impact of donors in the following conclusion. 
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a c t o R s 
No participants identified any external actors as having a significant impact on Tonga’s 
2010 democratic transition, and instead there was a near universal identification of 
Tupou V and ‘Akilisi Pohiva and the PDM as the key actors. Likely explanations for the 
absence of external forces include that foreign influence on the democratic transition was 
minimal and that such influence was not immediately apparent to research participants. 
Another possibility – national pride – could explain the omission of any external actors. 
Tongan participants might have been reluctant to identify foreign actors or individuals as 
having a significant impact on changes unique to Tongan society. National pride would not 
explain the responses of the non-Tongan participants in the research, almost all of whom 
also named Tupou V and Pohiva and the PDM as having the most impact on Tonga’s 
democratic transition. Given the near universal identification of Tupou V and Pohiva 
and the PDM, it would be untenable to offer a conclusion that omits the observation that 
those two actors had a significant impact on Tonga’s democratic transition. The influence 
of donors, however, begins to appear when the causes of the democratic transition are 
analysed. 
c a u s E s 
While donors or other external forces were not identified as significant actors in the reform 
process, their influence, albeit in an indirect manner, became apparent when participants 
were asked to identify the major causes of Tonga’s democratic transition. The influence 
of donors can be linked to two of the three most commonly identified causes: globalisa-
tion and migration; and the inevitability of change. Donors have funded scholarships for 
Tongan students to study abroad for several decades, introducing students to the differ-
ent cultures and political environments of countries such as New Zealand, Australia, and 
the United States. Those experiences inevitably shape the world views of the scholarship 
recipients and their families, in some instances in ways contrary to traditional Tongan 
culture. Similarly, donor investment in Tonga’s domestic education system has helped 
create an increasingly educated population able to look beyond Tonga’s shores to assess 
and consider different ways of approaching political issues. Individuals working for donors 
in Tonga also bring their own global perspectives, which may influence their Tongan 
colleagues. Finally, a number of participants suggested that donors actively encouraged 
Tonga to join and participate in international bodies, where the rarity of Tonga’s former 
governing arrangements would have become increasingly apparent. 
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d o n o R  a c t i v i t i E s 
When participants were asked to identify specifically how donors assisted Tonga’s demo-
cratic transition, the impact of donors became clear. As mentioned earlier, the identified 
activities of donors generally fell into five categories: political engagement; punitive 
actions; financial support; institution building; and indirect actions. The impact of each 
category on the democratic transition is analysed below, followed by a consideration of the 
notion that donors inadvertently hindered the reform process. 
Political engagement: The impact of political engagement is difficult to ascertain. 
Engagement with the Tongan Government prior to it announcing a path of political reform 
appears not to have had any major impact on Tonga’s democratic transition, though to 
state this conclusively would require an understanding of interpersonal diplomatic rela-
tions beyond that uncovered by this research. It is quite possible that the representatives of 
donor governments pressed the issue of democracy on Tupou V before his coronation, but 
there is little evidence to support such a claim. Political engagement from New Zealand 
and Australia after the Government of Tupou V announced that it would introduce demo-
cratic reform was recognised by actors from within the Tongan Government as important, 
though generally in a symbolic nature. The impact of donors’ public offers of financial and 
technical support for democratic reform is less questionable. The public offers of support 
were said to have hardened the resolve of those calling for reform, and prevented the 
Tongan Government from making the otherwise legitimate point that it did not have suffi-
cient resources to enact democratic reform. 
Punitive actions: The punitive actions of donors appear to have had little impact on 
Tonga’s democratic transition. There is no obvious correlation between the punitive 
actions outlined in this chapter and the Tongan Government’s decision to enact political 
reform. It is possible that the punitive actions had the perverse impact of hardening the 
resolve of the those supporting the status quo, while simultaneously unfairly punishing 
the Tongan public. There were just as likely to be domestic reasons for public criticism of 
the Tongan Government from foreign elected officials as there are reasons of principle, 
especially from those politicians representing electorates with significant ex-pat Tongan 
communities. 
Financial and technical support: The most obvious impact that donors had on Tonga’s 
democratic transition was through financial and technical support. Financial support for 
the PDM, if it did actually occur, represents a significant impact as the PDM was recog-
nised as one of the two most important actors that shaped Tonga’s democratic transition. 
Other financial support was important and it is possible that without such support Tonga’s 
democratic transition would not have occurred in the relatively orderly manner that it did. 
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Financial and technical support was generally used to provide for the necessary ‘adminis-
tration’ that a reform as significant as Tonga’s democratic transition requires. 
Perhaps the biggest impact that donors may have had on Tonga’s democratic transition 
was through financial support to the PDM. While this research did not uncover categorical 
evidence of such support, it is the conclusion of this thesis on the balance of probabili-
ties that, based on the testimony of five separate participants, donor financial support 
was provided to the PDM. Given that the PDM and its de facto leader, ‘Akilisi Pohiva, 
were nearly unanimously identified as one of the two most important actors in Tonga’s 
democratic transition, this support from donors is very significant. Financial support 
from donors likely allowed the PDM to remain operational, thus ensuring that the issue of 
democracy remained in the public discourse in Tonga. Although it is difficult, if not impos-
sible, to state the exact impact of donors’ financial support on the activities of PDM, it is 
not unreasonable to conclude that it was an important source of funding for an organisa-
tion that had few wealthy benefactors. Supporting the PDM, the organisation that led the 
calls for democratic reform in Tonga, is possibly the most significant impact that donors 
had on Tonga’s democratic transition.  
The financial and technical support provided by donors to the Tongan Government once it 
set out on a course to democratic reform was critical to the success of Tonga’s democratic 
transition. Donors’ support helped ensure the necessary details of such a major reform 
programme – the amendments to the legislation, the alterations of electorate boundaries, 
the updating of the electoral roll, and the establishment of the TEC, to name but a few – 
were completed in time for the 2010 elections. Without such support, Tonga’s democratic 
transition would have been a less orderly affair. Civic education, another necessary detail 
of such a reform, was also supported by donors, although concerns were raised about its 
effectiveness.24 The support of the donors helped earn approval from the New Zealand and 
Australian election monitors, who described the election as “genuine, free and fair” (Davis 
and Hayes 2010). 
Institution building: Donor support for Tonga’s institutions, particularly its judiciary, 
certainly had an impact on its democratic transition. Tonga’s independent judiciary 
willingly upheld decisions that drew the ire of the Tongan Government, simultaneously 
providing hope to the pro-democrats. Successive Chief Justices – whose salary was 
provided by donors – demonstrated a willingness to uphold human rights and the law, 
regardless of the impact it had on Tonga’s Government or its opponents. The actions of the 
judiciary limited the ability of the Tongan Government to stifle their opponents by manip-
ulating the law. 
24 Which are addressed in the next chapter. 
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Indirect actions: As noted already, donor support for education had an important, if 
indirect, impact on Tonga’s democratic transition. The impact of donor governments’ 
immigration policies can be viewed in two contradictory lights. One school of thought is 
that immigration policies reduced tensions in Tonga by encouraging the emigration of 
citizens that might have otherwise supported calls for change. The opposite perspective 
is that emigration introduced Tongans to different cultures and political environments in 
countries such as New Zealand, Australia, and the United States. This research does not 
focus on which perspective outweighs the other, but it is a reasonable conclusion to say 
that donor government immigration policies did have an impact on Tonga’s democratic 
transition, whether for ill or good. 
d i d  d o n o R s  h i n d E R  R E f o R m ? 
One participant suggested that donors had hindered democratic reform by giving the 
Tongan elite a ‘buffer’, in the form of aid, to resist calls for change, a theory that was subse-
quently tested in all remaining interviews. Most participants rebuffed the suggestion, 
though some accepted it had merit. It was noted that the primacy of donor relationships 
with the elite are common throughout the Pacific, and New Zealand participants raised 
concerns that if this were not the case then China would happily fill the void left by the 
‘traditional’ donors. Importantly, all who accepted the merit of the theory noted that there 
exists little alternative, as aid is given with the intention of improving the socioeconomic 
conditions of Tongan citizens. One participant with an extensive experience in foreign 
affairs noted that to withhold such aid to try to hasten a democratic transition would have 
been a “blunt approach”.25 
5. Conclusion: the Overall Impact of Donors 
Based on an analysis of three key themes that were addressed in research interviews – the 
important actors in Tonga’s democratic transition, its causes, and the actions of donors – 
this chapter concludes that donors had a significant impact on Tonga’s democratic tran-
sition. Direct impacts were confined largely to assisting the reform process once it began, 
but donors indirectly impacted on the transition in several ways. 
25 The parallels with the policies of New Zealand and Australia toward post-coup Fiji are ironically clear, though 
the ‘blunt approach’ in respect of that country now appears to be softening. 
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Support for the PDM, concluded on the balance of probabilities to have been provided, is 
perhaps the most significant impact, given that the PDM was identified as one of the two 
most important actors in Tonga’s 2010 democratic transition. Whether support for the 
PDM extended beyond financial assistance is unclear, leaving the most likely conclusion 
that, while donors did not directly impact on Tonga’s democratic through the PDM, donors 
indirectly impacted on the process by enabling the PDM to remain operational. Other 
notable indirect impacts of donors on the transition process resulted from its support for 
the judiciary and the education system, as well as donor governments’ domestic immigra-
tion policies. The direct impact of donors on Tonga’s democratic transition was generally 
confined to assisting the reform process once it had been put in motion. In essence, donors 
helped provide the necessary details for a reform as significant as Tonga’s democratic tran-
sition. It is possible that donors hindered Tonga’s democratic reform by providing a buffer 
to the Tongan establishment, but there were few alternative options available. 
Overall, this thesis concludes that the eventual shape of Tonga’s democratic transition 
was decided by Tongan actors, with its implementation being substantially supported by 
donors. The impetus for reform can be partially attributed to donors, albeit in an indirect 
manner, through the support for the PDM, the judiciary and education. The next chapter 
considers the lessons learned from Tonga’s democratic transition, and whether donors 
could and should have acted differently in relation to the issue of democracy in Tonga. 
It will also consider the role that donors can play to encourage further consolidation of 
Tonga’s democracy.  
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VIII. Tonga’s 
Democratic Transition: 
Lessons Learned 
Having concluded that donors did have a significant and diverse impact, this chapter 
considers the lessons that can be learned from the 2010 Tongan democratic transition. It 
does so by analysing the data gathered in interviews in relation to two different themes: 
whether Tonga’s democratic transition could have been brought about in a more effective 
manner; and whether the contribution of donors to Tonga’s democratic transition could 
and should have differed. Analysis of the two themes makes up the first two sections of this 
chapter. Three clear themes emerged when participants were asked if Tonga’s democratic 
transition could have occurred differently: the timeframe of the transition; the civic educa-
tion campaign that preceded the 2010 election; and the capacity of elected candidates. In 
respect of donor involvement, participants were generally positive, though some suggested 
that donors could have used their own democratic experience to offer more guidance to 
the Tongan Government, as well as supporting candidate capacity building. New Zealand 
participants were careful to stress that the actions of donors were constrained by the sover-
eignty of the Tongan Government. 
Based on the data set out in the first two sections, the third section offers some key lessons 
from Tonga’s democratic transition. The section pays particular regard to the timeframe 
of the transition, the civic education campaign, the capacity of the candidates and MPs, 
and the involvement of donors. The section offers different approaches that donors could 
have taken in Tonga, and weighs the pros and cons of such actions. It also provides sugges-
tions for donor activities, now and in the future, to assist the consolidation of democracy 
in Tonga. The final section concludes. As in the previous chapter, all the data set out below 
is based on testimony from individuals from New Zealand or Tonga that were participants 
in, or close observers of, Tonga’s 2010 democratic transition. Unless otherwise noted, the 
information was independently corroborated by at least two different participants. 
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1. What Aspects of Tonga’s Democratic Transition Could 
Have Been Improved? 
Participants were asked to identify aspects of Tonga’s democratic transition that they 
considered could have been improved. Responses were diverse, but three clear themes 
emerged. Participants spoke about the timeframe for the democratic transition’s necessary 
reforms, the quality of the civic education campaign that preceded the 2010 democratic 
transition, and the capacity of the candidates who gained election in 2010. Each theme is 
considered below. 
t i m E f R a m E 
Many participants raised concerns about the speed with which the necessary reforms 
for Tonga’s democratic transition were implemented. The first election under the new 
system was held in 2010, five years after the Tongan Government committed to introduc-
ing democratic reforms, a period many participants lamented as being too short. While 
the National Committee on Political Reform consulted widely in 2006 about the issue of 
democracy, it was not until after the 2008 elections that work on reforms began in earnest. 
The Constitutional and Electoral Commission (CEC) was given less than a year to complete 
its work, which involved considering and presenting a proposal for the shape of a reformed 
system of government for Tonga. Unsurprisingly, some participants raised concerns about 
a failure by the CEC to consult widely. The CEC was also unable to conduct a civic educa-
tion campaign, as it was initially mandated to do, with that task instead being assigned to 
the Prime Minister’s Office. Parliament did not reach a final consensus on the recommen-
dations of the CEC, and therefore the shape of the future Tongan Government, until May 
2010, just five months before the elections under the new system were held. 
A number of participants argued that the hurried nature of the reforms meant that there 
was insufficient time to properly develop the roles of the separate branches of govern-
ment. The procedural rules of government were also said to be under-prepared. Some 
participants argued that the vote of no confidence mechanism has been used cynically 
by parliamentarians in the current electoral term (2011-2014), which they saw as a direct 
result of the failure to properly consider it and other the rules of government before the 
2010 election. There was said to be insufficient consideration of other key issues, such as 
the voting system and the electorates, and too much focus placed on how many People’s 
Representatives would be elected to Parliament. Many participants claimed that there 
was insufficient time for the Tongan people to properly consider the proposed reforms, 
and what it might mean for their government. The civic education campaign, which is 
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considered in the next section, was said to have suffered from a lack of time, and was 
hurried and insufficient as a result. 
On the other hand, some participants suggested that the timeframe for the reforms, 
which most conceded was short, was nevertheless appropriate. Those who held this view 
argued that no different outcome would have resulted from delayed reforms, but it would 
have only led to more bickering between parties that had become entrenched in their 
views, further exacerbating tensions. Some thought that if no definite date was set for 
an election under a reformed system, it might never have happened, as opposing forces 
would endlessly pursue a futile search for the ‘perfect’ system. It was said that perhaps it 
was better to simply carry out the reforms as quickly as possible, and deal with the result-
ing issues subsequently, as the real danger was thought to be in the change itself, not the 
changed outcome. From the donors’ perspective, a number of participants stated that 
reforms in Tonga took longer than they hoped. None described the reform process as hasty 
or overly rushed. 
c i v i c  E d u c at i o n  c a m p a i g n 
Numerous Tongan and New Zealand participants raised concerns about the civic educa-
tion campaign that ran in 2009.26 The compressed nature of the reform process meant 
that the civic education campaign ran at the same time the CEC was drafting its recom-
mendations for Parliament, leaving uncertainty about the eventual shape of the reforms. 
Many participants suggested that the civic education campaign was too brief and failed 
to properly address the myriad issues of a democratic transition, leaving Tongans insuf-
ficiently informed about the new system of government and their role in electing future 
Ministers. 
Community meetings were held throughout Tonga, but they were said to be poorly 
attended. Participation from those that did attend was said to be minimal. Some partici-
pants suggested that Tongan culture has a distinct hierarchical quality, which discourages 
public debate between different social strata, and that this was the cause of low partici-
pation in community meetings. A number of participants suggested that an anonymous 
form of engagement with the reform process might have encouraged more participation 
26 It is important to note that there were two civic education campaigns in the lead up to the 2010 elections. The 
first in 2009 was organised through the Prime Minister’s Office and jointly coordinated by the Civil Society 
Forum of Tonga, the second was overseen by the Tongan Electoral Commission in the months leading up the 
2010 election. Concerns raised by participants relate specifically to the first campaign, and it is that campaign 
that is the focus of this section. 
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by Tongans. Radio and television programmes were also produced, but public engagement 
with the programmes was also said to be relatively poor. 
Participants raised concerns about the nature of the civic education campaign. The 
involvement of Viliami Afeaki, who helped coordinate the civic education campaign, was 
objected to by some participants due to past disagreements between Afeaki and some 
leaders of the pro-democracy movement (PDM). Others felt that the civic education 
campaign failed to counter expectations that democracy would bring prosperity to Tonga, 
expectations that a number of participants accused the PDM of fostering. The content of 
the civic education campaign was generally confined to the legal elements of the proposed 
reforms and the changes to the composition of the executive. When it moved into more 
philosophical territory, such as encouraging citizens to consider the value of their vote and 
other responsibilities of democracy, it attracted criticism for being biased. A few Tongan 
participants suggested that there was no need to discuss the responsibilities of democracy, 
as most Tongans understood the principles through participating in church, town and 
district officers elections, or through their experience of democratic elections abroad. 
c a p a c i t y  o f  c a n d i d at E s 
The third theme that appeared regularly in discussions about aspects of Tonga’s demo-
cratic transition that could have been improved was concerns about the capacity of candi-
dates in the 2010 elections. Some participants felt that more could have been done to 
ensure that there were sufficiently skilled candidates, as they would now be eligible for, 
and make-up the majority of, Tonga’s executive. For some the perceived27 poor quality of 
the candidates was due to the failure of the civic education campaign to sufficiently stress 
the importance of electing qualified people as MPs, given that they might subsequently 
become Ministers. For others, however, such inferences in a civic awareness campaign 
would have been considered biased and should be avoided. A number of participants 
noted dryly that the behaviour of the current group of MPs would ensure that Tongans 
would more carefully consider their vote in the next election, scheduled for 2014. 
Many participants identified the design of the reformed electoral system as contrib-
uting to the election of MPs whose qualities were perceived as inadequate. Under the 
previous system, nine People’s Representatives were elected from a mix of single- and 
multi-member constituencies.28 Voters cast the same number of votes as there were 
27 This thesis makes no attempt to assess the qualities of Tonga’s MPs and their capacity to carry out work  
as Ministers. 
28 There were three people’s representatives for Tongatapu, two from Vava’u, two from Ha’apai, and one  
from each of ‘Eua and the Nuias (Campbell 2011). 
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People’s Representatives for that region and the candidate, or candidates, that gained 
the most votes were elected. The reformed system introduced seventeen single-member 
constituencies. Based on the historical New Zealand first-past-the-post (FPP) system, 
representatives from each constituency gained election by winning the most votes. This 
system contrasts with that recommended by the CEC, who advocated for a transfera-
ble vote model with multi-member constituencies in Tongatapu. The final report of the 
CEC (2009) raises concerns about using an FPP system in Tonga, as it had historically 
resulted in candidates winning election with significantly less than 50% of the votes cast. 
Parliamentarians argued that the recommendations of the CEC would add further compli-
cations to the reform process, and therefore introduced what was presented as the simpler 
model of seventeen single-member constituencies and the FPP system. Proponents of the 
single-member constituencies argued that they would encourage greater accountability on 
behalf of representatives, however several participants voiced doubts about whether that 
goal had been achieved. (Campbell 2011) 
The lack of women’s representation was highlighted by some participants, with one 
participant arguing that special measures should have been put in place to ensure women’s 
representation in the Tongan Parliament. Twelve women stood in the 2010 election but 
none were able to garner sufficient support, which some participants attributed to the elec-
toral system chosen by Parliament. 
2. Could and Should Donors Have Acted Differently 
Towards the Issue of Democracy in Tonga? 
Participants were asked whether donors could or should have acted differently in relation 
to Tonga’s democratic transition. Generally, Tongan participants considered that donors, 
and here participants were most often referring to the New Zealand and Australian aid 
programmes, had provided good support to the Tongan Government as it undertook 
the reform process and did not attempt to unduly interfere. Some Tongan participants 
suggested that the experience of donors with democratic governments could have been 
better utilised to warn Tongan officials about the possible negative outcomes of key deci-
sions in the reform process. The question of whether donors should have provided assis-
tance aimed at improving the capacity of candidates drew mixed responses. When asked 
if donors could have acted differently, New Zealand participants generally highlighted 
constraints in the aid relationship that prevent donors from acting as they wish. The final 
part of this section considers responses to the question of whether donors should have 
been involved in Tonga’s democratic transition. 
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d o n o R s ’  d E m o c R at i c  E x p E R i E n c E 
A number of Tongan participants said that donors, given their experience with democracy 
in their home countries and the comparative lack of experience in Tonga of democratic 
politics, should have alerted the Tongan Government to the possible flaws in their deci-
sions. Participants who made this suggestion were more likely to have complaints with 
the capacity of the representatives elected in the 2010 election, and in some instances 
it appeared that political rivalries, rather than a sound policy basis, was the underlying 
reason for raising the issue. This was not always the case, however, and more independent 
observers argued forcefully that donors should have intervened to ensure that Tonga chose 
the best possible system of democracy. 
c a p a c i t y  o f  c a n d i d at E s 
Some participants suggested that donors could have offered support to build the capacity 
of Tonga’s politicians. One Tongan participant even indicated that resources should have 
been specifically dedicated to capacity building for PDM candidates, who were expected 
to succeed in the elections (which they subsequently did). What that capacity building 
would have looked like was not clear. It is arguable that a visit by New Zealand parliamen-
tarians in the lead up to the 2010 election to meet with Tongan MPs and candidates was 
an example of capacity building, albeit a limited one. Some participants suggested that 
if donor support for democracy is taken to a logical conclusion then assistance must be 
offered to candidates and political parties, though others were wary of that notion. It was 
suggested that assisting politicians to prepare manifestos would encourage policy debate 
during the campaign period and encourage accountability through public documenta-
tion on which politicians’ subsequent conduct could be judged. Donor participants, with 
one or two exceptions, were generally lukewarm to the notion of capacity building, citing 
concerns about perceptions of political interference. 
d o m E s t i c  c o n s t R a i n t s  o n  t h E  a i d  R E l at i o n s h i p 
Several New Zealand participants noted that donors are constrained by the agenda of the 
Tongan Government, and the failure to take alternative approaches must be considered 
with that constraint in mind. The Tongan aid relationship must be agreed to by the Tongan 
Government, and therefore there was little that could be done if the Tongan Government 
did not want to follow a donor’s preferred course. That is not to say that donors did not 
try to pressure Tonga towards democracy. New Zealand participants made it clear that 
they favoured democratic change in Tonga, and that Tongan officials well understood 
that position. New Zealand’s representatives had to weigh up how much pressure could 
76
be exerted to bring about the changes it supported while still maintaining a positive 
working relationship with the Tongan Government. One participant with extensive expe-
rience both in the Pacific and New Zealand Government accused many donors of being 
too constrained by ‘PC’ behaviour and shying away from robust discussions about what 
donors considered a misguided approach to government. The participant noted that while 
an understanding of the cultural context is important in the aid relationship, no individ-
ual culture is immune from criticism and donors should be more willing to stand up for 
human rights issues, such as the right to take part in government (as enshrined in Article 
21 of the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948). 
s h o u l d  d o n o R s  h av E  b E E n  i n v o lv E d  i n  t o n g a’s  d E m o c R at i c 
t R a n s i t i o n ? 
Most participants, both Tongan and New Zealand, considered donor involvement in 
Tonga’s democratic transition appropriate. Tongan participants stated that Tonga did not 
have the financial and technical means to enact the reforms necessary for its democratic 
transition, and without donor support any reforms would likely have failed. New Zealand 
participants suggested that wealthier democratic countries are morally obliged to support 
less wealthy countries attempting to become more democratic. A number of participants 
noted that donor motivations were not solely altruistic, pointing out that it is in New 
Zealand’s interest to have secure and economically healthy countries in the Pacific. Donor 
participants identified democracy as the most likely vehicle to foster prosperous and 
secure nations. 
Two Tongan participants demonstrated early modernist thinking, and argued that donors 
should have primarily focused on supporting economic development in Tonga, which 
would have resulted in an emerging middle class that would have demanded the right to 
participate in government. It is possible to contend that this sequence – economic devel-
opment preceding democratic development – did in fact occur in Tonga, albeit at a slower 
pace than those two participants would have preferred. The Tongan economy did grow 
rapidly during the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s, after which calls for democratic reform 
first became widespread (Campbell 2001). It would be mere conjecture to claim that a sole 
focus on economic development by donors would have hastened this sequence. Further 
research into whether Tonga did demonstrate sequencing in the manner suggested by the 
modernists of the 1950s and 1960s is needed to illuminate the issue. 
Two other Tongan participants argued that donors should only have been involved in 
Tonga’s democratic transition if the ends justified the means. In this somewhat circular 
argument the two participants stated that donor involvement was inappropriate at the 
time it took place, but if the involvement bought about positive change in the form of 
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democratic reform or economic development then it was justified. Citing concerns about 
foreign influence on Tongan politics, the two participants both conceded that reform was 
necessary, but felt that if the reforms did not meet expectations then donor influence was 
inappropriate. Contrived at best, this logic holds that any intervention is appropriate only 
if it is subsequently shown to have been worthwhile and it therefore offers little guidance 
to policy makers. 
3. Lessons Learned from the Tongan Experience 
A number of lessons relating to Tonga’s democratic transition can be gleaned from the 
information set out in the preceding two chapters. This section considers the timeframe 
of the democratic transition, the nature of the civic education programme, the capacity of 
candidates, the involvement of donors, and the importance of economic development. 
t i m E f R a m E 
The time that has passed since the 2010 reforms provides the benefit of hindsight 
in considering whether the reform process in Tonga was indeed rushed. Given the 
entrenched nature of Tongan politics in the two decades prior to the 2010 reforms, the 
argument that more time would have resulted in further division is particularly persuasive. 
The current Tongan Government looks set to see out its full term, albeit having presented 
a number of different ministerial iterations, diminishing the argument that there was 
insufficient time to properly develop the rules of government. Whether the Tongan people 
were given sufficient time to properly consider the implications of reform is unclear. This 
question underpins the issues of civic education and candidate capacity that are the focus 
of the following two parts of this section. 
c i v i c  E d u c at i o n 
Whether there was sufficient time for the civic education campaign in Tonga is moot. Any 
assessment of the  civic education campaign will depend on what goals the campaign was 
intended to achieve. If it was merely an informative campaign about the changes to execu-
tive recruitment in Tonga then it could be considered a success. If, on the other hand, the 
civic education campaign was designed to get Tongans thinking about the responsibilities 
of democracy and in particular the worth of their vote then based on participant testimony 
the civic education campaign could at best be judged a partial success. As mentioned 
previously, whether the civic education campaign should have more thoroughly addressed 
78
the responsibilities of democracy was considered controversial by some, though perhaps 
by those with the most to lose. If officials wanted Tongans to be more calculating in their 
election choices then more focus should have been placed on the individual responsibili-
ties of democracy and the need to elect the best candidates, not those who have won favour 
through other means. 
The goals of the civic education campaign, however, are irrelevant if there is no engage-
ment. It is difficult to assess whether engagement with the civic education campaign in 
Tonga could have been improved. Low community engagement with politics is not an 
issue unique to Tonga, but one found throughout the world. It is important to note that low 
engagement levels with the official civic education campaign in Tonga is not indicative of 
low political engagement levels generally. The high turnout at the 2010 election and popu-
larity of the leaders of PDM indicate that Tongans were engaged with the issue of reform. 
Policy makers and government leaders need to consider how that engagement took shape, 
and consider ways in which official channels can participate in that process. 
c a p a c i t y  o f  c a n d i d at E s 
As with low political engagement, the issue of politicians of questionable capacity is not 
unique to Tonga. One need only cast one’s eye over a few weeks of political stories in any 
established democracy to see that intelligence and common sense are not prerequisites 
for elected office anywhere. While important, complaints about the capacity of politicians 
should be taken with a degree of scepticism. Politics is rife with partisanship, and opposi-
tion politicians are invariably considered inferior to those whom engender one’s support. 
Charging donors with building the capacity of candidates appears problematic on a 
number of levels. In any democratic contest it is difficult to identify with certainty which 
candidates will win, especially in contests with many candidates. Providing support to all 
candidates would be costly, but to pick and choose recipients for support would rightly 
draw accusations of favouritism. Donor support for further civic education campaigns 
about the responsibilities of democracy could be worthwhile, but, as noted, can be conten-
tious. That controversy is perhaps best avoided. Donors could support mechanisms that 
enable voters to get a better sense of the capacity of candidates, although this is best done 
by a local, independent media (which itself could be supported by donors). One possibility 
for donor support is assisting in the production of candidate profiles and other materials 
by an apolitical body, such as the Tongan Electoral Commission, similar to those that are 
provided to voters for local body elections in New Zealand. Another possibility might see 
donors provide support for candidate debates. Donor support, however, should remain as 
apolitical as possible to avoid accusations of partisanship. 
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In the face of the fluctuating capacity of elected politicians, it is important that the public 
sector has the strength to manage ministerial changes. The world’s established democra-
cies have large bureaucracies that continue to function despite regular political change, 
ensuring that the state continues to meet its obligations. Donor funding to build the 
capacity in the Tongan public service to carry out the state’s duties and manage ministe-
rial changes is necessary to ensure the success of Tonga’s democratic transition. Further 
research is required to consider whether current reforms of the Tongan public service, 
which are supported by the Australian aid programme, meet this goal, and whether other 
approaches are necessary. 
Donors could have relied on their own countries’ histories to attempt to persuade the 
Tongan Government to implement a different electoral system, which may have resulted 
in candidates of greater capacity gaining election. Both of the main donors that contrib-
uted to Tonga’s democratic transition, New Zealand and Australia, employ proportional 
voting systems, having moved away from the FPP system, which Tonga introduced, with 
the intention of improving representation. The former uses the mixed-member propor-
tional (MMP) system to determine the composition of its Parliament, while the latter 
uses both alternative voting and single transferable vote (STV) systems. Tonga has no 
tradition of political parties, making MMP, which relies on stable political parties, an 
inappropriate option. A different voting system (such as STV, which was recommended by 
the CEC) could have been introduced, and might have resulted in a more representative 
Parliament.29 
d o n o R  i n v o lv E m E n t 
The majority of participants did not express concerns with donor involvement in Tonga’s 
democratic transition. Indeed, some argued for more robust donor involvement, though no 
participant who experienced the ‘front-line’ of the aid relationship between New Zealand 
and Tonga suggested that donor involvement was unnecessarily constrained. The call for 
donors to rely on their own democratic experience to help guide Tonga’s democratic transi-
tion indicates that many participants had the impression that donors were unwilling to 
overstep the bounds of sovereignty in the face of decisions that in hindsight could prove 
unwise. Whether this was indeed the case is unclear, but it is obvious that many partic-
ipants considered it appropriate for donors to offer unsolicited advice if the advice was 
considered to be in the best interests of Tonga. In a aid paradigm that increasingly empha-
sises recipient government sovereignty, it is interesting to note that so many Tongan 
29 Parliament’s decision to introduce single-member FPP electorates had the support of ‘Akilisi Pohiva and his 
supporters, which, as the most organised political movement in Tonga, likely had the most to gain from that 
system. 
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participants were willing to be guided by donors in areas where they conceded the donors 
had more expertise. 
E c o n o m i c  d E v E l o p m E n t 
One thing that became apparent in discussions with many participants was that the 
success of Tonga’s democratic transition is contingent on the country’s economic devel-
opment. In the words of one Tongan participant, “political reform without economic 
development goes nowhere”, or to paraphrase another, if the slow economic development 
that beset Tonga during the final decade of the former governing system is not rectified 
under the new system, then the reforms are merely cosmetic. In this regard, the pivot of 
New Zealand’s aid programme towards sustainable economic development and similar 
moves under the recently elected Abbott Government in Australia might have come at an 
appropriate time for Tonga. How the focus on economic development of two of its major 
aid partners will play out in Tonga is not yet clear. It is important that donors take action 
to reduce the barriers to trade Tonga faces, as without such action many of Tonga’s export 
industries will continue to struggle. Donors must understand that the success of the 
Tongan economy will likely dictate the success of its democratic transition. 
4. Conclusion 
It is often said that hindsight provides 20:20 vision, and it is no different when considering 
Tonga’s 2010 democratic transition. Three clear themes emerged when participants were 
asked to identify aspects of Tonga’s democratic transition that could have been improved: 
its timeframe; civic education; and the capacity of elected candidates. Solid arguments 
were made on both sides in respect to the timeframe, while the issue of capacity is one 
that all democracies confront and has no easy solution. Donor involvement in Tonga’s 
democratic transition was generally looked upon favourably, though some participants 
suggested that donors could have taken a more robust approach when faced with decisions 
by the Tongan Government that might have less than favourable democratic outcomes. 
The question of whether donors could have acted differently towards Tonga’s democratic 
transition is hypothetical, but it is clear that donors are in a position to introduce and 
implement policies that would significantly increase the chances of democratic consoli-
dation in Tonga. If donors want to see Tongan democracy consolidate then this research 
indicates that they must focus on assisting sustainable economic development that is felt 
by all Tongans. 
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IX. Conclusion 
The roots of Tonga’s 2010 democratic transition can be traced back to the reign of King 
George Tupou I in the nineteenth century and the passage of the Tongan Constitution 
in 1875. Momentum behind the cause of democracy gained force through the 1980s and 
1990s, before becoming unstoppable under the reign of Tupou V in the 2000s. This thesis 
concludes that the role of donors in Tonga’s democratic transition was necessary, and that 
without such support it is unlikely that the transition could have occurred in the relatively 
peaceful and orderly manner that it did. Donors affected Tonga’s democratic transition 
in a variety of ways, from supporting to the Tongan Pro-democracy Movement (PDM) to 
providing the expertise necessary to implement the legal reforms. The Tongan experience 
of the transition to democracy highlights the need for citizens to properly understand the 
responsibilities of democracy and the worth of their vote, an important lesson in a world 
that is increasingly apathetic about the actions of its politicians. 
The first section of this conclusion returns to the primary and secondary research objec-
tives and questions outlined in the introductory chapter and provides a short summary 
of the findings in respect of each research question. It begins first with the research ques-
tions pertaining to the secondary objectives before culminating in a brief assessment of 
the impact of donors on Tonga’s 2010 democratic transition, the thesis’ primary objective. 
The second section describes some areas for further study that became apparent during 
the course of this thesis. The third section offers some final remarks on Tonga’s democratic 
transition and the role that donors can play to assist democratic progress in developing 
countries.  
1. Research Objectives and Questions 
The primary objective of this thesis has been to explore the impact of donors on Tonga’s 
2010 democratic transition. Three secondary objectives focused on aspects of Tonga’s 
democratic transition that could have been improved, how the role of donors in the tran-
sition could or should have differed, and the role that donors should play to assist the 
consolidation of democracy in Tonga. Seven research questions were posed at the outset of 
this thesis, which were used to meet its primary and secondary objectives. Each research 
question is repeated below alongside a summary of the findings of this thesis, beginning 
with the research questions that pertain to the secondary objectives. 
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s E c o n d a R y  o b j E c t i v E s 
What aspects of Tonga’s democratic transition could have been improved? Participants iden-
tified three issues that could have been managed differently during Tonga’s democratic 
transition: the timeframe of the reform programme; the civic education campaign; and 
the capacity of candidates elected in 2010.  There was little consensus about the time-
frame of the reform programme. Some participants advocated for a longer time period to 
enable wider consultation and more time to consider the impact of possible reforms. Other 
participants felt that the reform timetable was sufficient, and further delays would have 
only exacerbated tensions in an already divided polity. The two sides both present compel-
ling cases, and in reality the timetable of the reform programme could never have pleased 
everyone. On balance, the timeframe appears to have been appropriate, given fears about 
divisions in Tongan society and the durability of the Tongan Government since the 2010 
election (in spite of regular ministerial changes). 
The short timeframe was an underlying cause of the concerns raised about the ineffec-
tiveness of the civic education campaign, which in turn likely contributed to what was 
considered by some participants as the less than desirable capacity of some of the elected 
parliamentarians. The civic education campaign was said to be poorly attended and too 
brief. Its content was also questioned. Some participants advocated for a limited focus on 
the legal changes of Tonga’s democratic transition, while others argued for a more compre-
hensive campaign that considered the ‘responsibilities of democracy’. It is not as simple as 
saying X approach is the right one, but it is possible that more focus on the ‘responsibilities 
of democracy’ and the worth of an individual’s vote could have resulted in the election of 
a more capable body of politicians. Of course, it might have not made any difference at all, 
such is the uncertain nature of democracy. 
Could donors have acted differently in relation to the issue of democracy in Tonga? 
Participants generally expressed support for the assistance that donors provided Tonga’s 
democratic transition, and the vast majority of participants felt it was appropriate for 
donors to offer such assistance. One key theme that became apparent with Tongan partici-
pants was that donors should have been more willing to rely on their own democratic expe-
riences to help guide the reform process. One area where donors’ democratic experience 
might have been stressed upon their Tongan colleagues is in respect of the choice of the 
electoral system. Both of the two major donors involved in democratic reforms had moved 
away from the first-past-the-post system, which the Tongan Government introduced, in 
favour of electoral systems that produce more representative government. It is possible 
that Tonga’s Parliament might have been more representative and capable if another elec-
toral system, such as the transferable vote system that was advocated by the Constitutional 
and Electoral Commission (CEC), was implemented. Donor participants, however, noted 
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that the aid relationship is heavily constrained by the agenda of the partner government, 
indicating that they had little power to persuade the Tongan Government to refrain from 
policy decisions that donors considered less than optimal. 
What can donors do to help consolidate democracy in Tonga? Alongside continuing support 
for Tongan institutions that are concerned with maintaining the rule of law, such as the 
judiciary and the police, two issues were identified for donors to focus on in order to 
assist democratic consolidation in Tonga: support for its public service; and sustainable 
economic development. The inevitable fluctuations in ministerial capacity that accom-
pany a democratic system can be mitigated by a strong public service. Donor support 
for the public service, which is also ongoing, was identified as critical to consolidating 
democracy in Tonga. Economic development was also highlighted by several participants 
as being crucial to the ongoing success of Tongan democracy. The recent switch in focus 
of the New Zealand and Australian aid programmes further towards economic develop-
ment has perhaps come at the appropriate time for Tonga, although it is not yet clear how 
that switch in priorities will play out in Tonga. Participants were generally lukewarm to 
the suggestion that donors could directly assist the capacity building of Tongan politi-
cians, but it is possible that donors could assist Tongan institutions, such as its Electoral 
Commission, to provide materials that would make it easier for voters to assess the capabil-
ity of prospective candidates.  
p R i m a R y  o b j E c t i v E 
Three research questions were devoted to thesis’ primary objective, which is an assessment 
of the impact donors had on Tonga’s democratic transition. Each is listed below accompa-
nied by a summary of findings. A summary of the final research question, which encapsu-
lates the thesis’ primary objective follows. 
Who was/were the major actor/s involved in Tonga’s democratic transition? Participants 
overwhelmingly identified two actors as having the most influence over Tonga’s demo-
cratic transition: King George Tupou V; and the PDM, in particular its de facto leader 
‘Akilisi Pohiva. Simply, most participants stated that Tonga’s democratic transition would 
not have occurred in the manner it did without the acquiescence of Tupou V and the 
ability of the PDM and Pohiva to keep democracy in the public discourse. Interestingly, 
for the purposes of this thesis, no participant identified external forces as having a major 
impact on Tonga’s democratic transition, indicating either that the influence of foreigners 
was insignificant, not overtly apparent, or that participants chose not to emphasise the role 
of external forces. 
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What was/were the major cause/s of Tonga’s democratic transition? Three themes emerged 
when participants were asked to identify the causes of Tonga’s democratic transition: 
the influence of globalisation and migration; the inevitability of change; and the Tongan 
Government’s lack of accountability. Links can be made to donors in respect of the first 
two themes. The experiences of the Tongan diaspora, which since the 1970s has expanded 
significantly in New Zealand, Australia, and the United States facilitated by immigration 
policies in those countries, has affected how Tongans view their own culture and govern-
ment. Many participants framed Tonga’s democratic transition as inevitable in a world 
where hereditary monarchies with genuine political power have become increasingly rare. 
Tonga’s participation in global political bodies was said to underscore the uniqueness of 
their former governing arrangement. Finally, participants stated that the dubious actions 
of some members of the Tongan Government prior to the 2010 reforms strengthened the 
hand of the PDM by making it easier to manoeuvre public support behind the cause of 
political reform.  
What actions did donors take in relation to Tonga’s democratic transition? The actions of 
donors in relation to Tonga’s democratic transition fit into five broad categories: political 
engagement; punitive actions; financial and technical support; institution building; and 
indirect actions. 
Donor political engagement was demonstrated most prominently through public support 
for reform in Tonga. It was appreciated by both the PDM, as a means of invalidating 
claims that reform would be too costly, and the Tongan Government (once it set on a path 
to reform), as a demonstration of support in its reform programme. Donors engaged in 
punitive actions against the Tongan Government prior to it announcing that it would 
reform its political system, the most significant of which was the Australian Government’s 
policy in the early 2000s to withhold increases in its aid allocation until a political reform 
programme began. Other examples of donor punitive actions included public criticism 
of the Tongan Government by New Zealand Ministers prior to the 2002 Tongan election 
and the leak of a confidential report critical of the Tongan Government by a former New 
Zealand High Commissioner in 2003. 
Donors provided financial and technical support to a number of organisations that were 
directly concerned with Tonga’s democratic transition. Financial support to the PDM – not 
categorically proven but likely to have occurred – enabled it to maintain public pressure 
for democratic reform. Funding for the National Committee on Political Reform and the 
CEC was used to gather Tongan views on democracy, and, in respect of the latter, create 
the legal framework for a reformed Tongan Government. The civic education campaign, 
despite its noted flaws, received donor support, as did the Tongan Electoral Commission 
and the Royal Boundaries Commission. Donors also provided financial and technical 
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support for Tongan institutions, notably the judiciary and the police, in an effort to 
maintain the rule of law. 
Participants highlighted a number of indirect actions by donors that affected Tonga’s 
democratic transition. There is debate about the effect of donor immigration policy. One 
school of thought holds that Tongan emigration provided a ‘safety valve’ for the Tongan 
Government and allowed it to avoid devastatingly high unemployment rates. Conversely, 
the experience of Tongans abroad was said to have affected how Tongans viewed their 
own culture and politics and fostered more support for democratic reform. Donor support 
for education had an indirect effect to Tonga’s democratic transition through providing 
students an opportunity to experience other forms of government. 
How did donors impact on Tonga’s 2010 democratic transition? This thesis concludes that 
donors had a diverse impact on Tonga’s democratic transition. The impact of political 
engagement by donors is difficult to assess, but the regularity with which it was raised 
in interviews indicates that it had some degree of impact on the process, while punitive 
actions appear not have been very effective. The direct impact of donors was largely 
confined to financial and technical support for the reform process once it had been 
announced by the Tongan Government. Indirectly, support for institutions, in particular 
the judiciary, had a significant impact on Tonga’s democratic transition, as it prevented the 
Tongan Government from effectively using the law to stifle the proponents of democracy. 
Donor immigration policy and support for education contributed to a wider understanding 
of, and a demand for, democratic government in Tonga. 
The most significant impact that donors had on Tonga’s democratic transition was likely 
to have been through its support of the PDM, which was identified as one of the two most 
important actors in the transition. Without the PDM and the pressure that it placed on 
the Tongan Government to reform, it is unlikely that Tonga’s democratic transition would 
have taken place at all. If donor support enabled the PDM to more effectively campaign for 
democratic reform in Tonga, which this concludes it likely did, then donors had a signifi-
cant impact on Tonga’s democratic transition. 
2. Further Research 
Areas requiring further research have been highlighted throughout this thesis. Perhaps 
most importantly of all, more work needs to be done considering whether Tongans have 
come to understand the fuller idea of democracy, as a set of values not just a set of rules. 
This thesis has highlighted the importance of understanding the responsibilities of 
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democracy, and if research can contribute to widening that knowledge in Tonga then the 
likelihood of effective, capable, and representative government will increase. Political 
engagement in Tonga, an issue entwined with civic understanding of democracy in Tonga 
is also deserving of further scrutiny. 
Other areas worthy of further consideration have been noted, including: 
• the history of Tonga’s democratic evolution, and whether it mirrors the path envisaged 
by the modernists of the 1950s and 1960s;
• whether donor support for Tonga’s public service will help achieve democratic 
consolidation;
• the role that the independent media have played in the political evolution in Tonga; 
• the links between the PDM in Tonga and external actors, including donors and ex-pat 
Tongan groups; and
• the effect of emigration on Tongan politics. 
3. Final Remarks 
This thesis has highlighted the impact that donors have had on Tonga’s democratic transi-
tion, but it is important to note that it was domestic, not external, forces that were primar-
ily responsible for Tonga’s political evolution. That is not to say that external forces did not 
have an impact on Tonga’s democratic transition, and it has been clearly demonstrated 
that donors did have an impact, but it must be stressed that this thesis in no way attempts 
to diminish the role of domestic agents in providing the impetus for political reform. 
Caution must be exhibited when drawing wider conclusions from one case study, but this 
thesis has shown the enormous impact that an organised political movement, such as 
the PDM, can have in circumstances where there is a strong rule of law. If donors wish to 
support democratic change in developing countries, the Tongan experience indicates that 
serious consideration must be given to supporting such movements, alongside support for 
the rule of law and civic awareness. 
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XI. Appendix 
1. Semi-structured Interview Schedule 
What is your current, former roles? What role have/did you play in the democratic transi-
tion in Tonga?
Which organisations or individuals had the most impact on the democratic transition in 
Tonga? Why? What role did they play?
Did donors assist the democratic transition in Tonga? Did they hinder it? What practical 
assistance did donors provide to assist the democratic transition?
Were donors coordinated in their approach towards democratic reform in Tonga?  
Do you think that donors should have acted differently towards the issue of democratic 
reform in Tonga? Why? How could they have acted differently? Should donors be involved 
at all? 
What do you believe were the major causes of the democratic transition in Tonga?
If Tonga received no aid at all, do you think the democratic reform process in Tonga would 
have played out differently? 
Do you think that more needs to be done in the reform process in Tonga? Do you think that 
aid could play a role with those future actions? 
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